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DEMANDING JUSTICE WITHOUT TRUTH: THE
DIFFICULTY OF POSTMODERN FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.'
Postmodem philosophy has challenged our traditional concep-
tions of both rational knowledge and objective truth.2 Feminist theory
has contributed to the attack on rationality and objectivity by arguing
that the traditional objective viewpoint has all too often disguised a
viewpoint that is actually exclusively male.
3
This Comment argues that although feminist legal theory has
both benefited from, and contributed to, the postmodern critique of
reason and objectivity, feminists must take a hard look at the dangers
of abandoning these concepts altogether. Abandoning the traditional
ideas of rational knowledge and objective truth will leave feminist
legal theory without a needed critical position-a position that speaks
with authority from outside of socially contingent ways of living.
4
This Comment begins with a discussion of traditional philosophi-
cal theories about the nature of both knowledge and truth.5 Next, it
describes the rise of the postmodern world view in the disciplines of
science, anthropology, linguistics, literary theory, and philosophy.6 In
order to bring the many facets of postmodernism into focus, it con-
structs a brief outline of the possible approaches that a theorist might
take when faced with the challenge of the postmodern world view.7
Next, this Comment explores the work of Martha Minow, Catha-
fine MacKinnon, Stanley Fish, and Drucilla Cornell, four legal theo-
1. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THm LrrEuATUP oF ENGLAND
1115, 1115 (George K. Anderson & Karl J. Holzknecht eds., 1953).
2. This Comment will not attempt to define the term "postmodem." The reader will
be able to get a fair sense of the postmodern world view from the discussion infra part HI.
3. See, e.g., CATHARiNE A. MAcKiNNON, Introduction to FMnIMSM UNMODFED 1,
16 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, Introduction] (arguing that "[fleminism has revealed
nature and society to be mirrors of each other: the male gender looking at itself looking at
itself").
4. See infra parts V-VI.
5. See infra part II.
6. See infra part III.A-D.
7. See infra part lII.E.
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fists who have, to differing degrees, adopted the language and ideas of
postmodem philosophy.8 It closely analyzes their work to develop a
picture of the type of postmodernism that each theorist advocates.
Through this examination, this Comment reveals an inconsistency
that arises when a theorist simultaneously adopts both the
postmodern view of truth and knowledge, and the argument that radi-
cal feminist changes in society are necessary.9 It then revisits the out-
line of possible postmodern approaches and examines where each of
the four theorists fits in that outline.10
Finally, this Comment discusses what I have called "the difficulty
of postmodern feminist legal theory."" It demonstrates that, to the
extent feminist legal theorists adopt postmodernism, they undermine
both any moral justification for their feminist goals, and any privileged
status for their claims of knowledge about the truth of women's op-
pression. In this way, feminist legal scholars add their voices to the
chorus of "[t]he best" who "lack all conviction."'" The inevitability of
these consequences leads to the conclusion that postmodernism is to-
tally incompatible with feminist legal theory.'
3
II. TRADITIONAL TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE THEORY
Every philosophical theory has had to grapple with two central
questions: What, if there is such a thing, is the nature of truth or real-
ity? And if truth does exist, how do we come to have knowledge of it;
that is, how do we know things? Philosophers have traditionally
called the study of the nature of truth or reality "metaphysics," 4 and
have called the study of the nature of knowledge "epistemology."' 5 In
this Comment I will simply refer to these two terms as "truth theory"
and "knowledge theory."
8. See infra part IV.A-D.
9. See infra parts JV.A-D, V.
10. See infra part IV.E.
11. See infra part V.
12. Yeats, supra note 1, at 1115.
13. See infra part VI.
14. The English metaphysician Francis Herbert Bradley described metaphysics as "an
attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or
ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe... somehow as a whole."
THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WEsTERN PHmosopHy AND PHmosoPHERS 203 (J.O.
Urmson & Jonathan R6e eds., rev. ed. 1991) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
15. Epistemology is "[t]he branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, struc-
ture, methods and validity of knowledge." THE DICM-ONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 94
(Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1942) [hereinafter DICnONARY]. The word is from the Greek
episteme (knowledge) and logos (theory). Id.
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Any sophisticated philosophical theory should have both a com-
plete truth theory and a complete knowledge theory. That is, the the-
orist should explain to the rest of us what the truth of the situation is,
and how the theorist is able to know that truth.
Traditional knowledge theory posits the existence of an external,
objective reality that can be "known" through the senses and ordered
through reason.' 6 According to most traditional knowledge theories,
the way a person knows anything is by directly perceiving the world's
objective reality, and then using the reasoning processes of the ra-
tional mind to order one's direct perceptions in the transcendental
realm.17
For Plato, this transcendental realm was the realm of "Forms,"
where eternal ideals such as Justice, Beauty, and Equality resided.'8
Knowledge of these eternal Forms was the proper goal of philoso-
phy.19 Plato considered the world of the senses to be unreal and com-
pared it to shadows on the wall of a cave.20 The real world was the
"world of the mind," where the Forms behind appearances were ap-
prehended by the philosopher. 2' To enter this world the philosopher
had to make the "rough ascent [up from the cave] ... into the light of
the sun."22
The medieval philosophers believed that the transcendental
realm was that of the Christian God?3 According to these "natural
law" scholars, earthly law itself was a reflection of the divine order
and will of God.24 Richard Hooker exemplified the jurisprudence of
the day with the statement: "[O]f law there can be no less acknowl-
edged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony
of the world.... ."25
16. See, for example, Daniel Morrissey's description of Immanuel Kant's knowledge
theory: The mind contains "a certain preexisting classification system that it uses to syn-
thesize the raw data of experience and make it understandable." Daniel J. Morrissey,
Moral Truth and the Law: A New Look at an Old Link, 47 SMU L. Rnv. 61, 68 (1993).
17. Id. at 67-69.
18. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 243; PLATO, The Republic, in GREAT DIA-
LOGUES OF PLATO 118, 312-16 (Eric H. Warmington & Philip G. Rouse eds. & W.H.D.
Rouse trans., 1984).
19. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 243.
20. PLATO, supra note 18, at 312-16.
21. Id. at 315.
22. Id. at 313.
23. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise
of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 434 (1987).
24. Id
25. RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 127 (Arthur Ste-
phen McGrade ed., 1989).
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For Saint Thomas Aquinas, "the eternal law is the plan of govern-
ment in the Chief Governor, [and] all the plans of government in the
inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law."'2 6 Thus, "[a]
tyrannical law... is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a per-
version of law."27 Saint Thomas believed human beings were en-
dowed with "a share of the Eternal Reason,"2 and thus were
naturally inclined to follow their proper ends and participate in the
eternal law.29
Modern philosophers such as Descartes and Kant removed the
transcendental realm from the Kingdom of God and placed it in the
rational mind.3 0 For Kant, "reason of itself, independent on all expe-
rience, ordains what ought to take place. '31 Using reason, all rational
beings could devise laws that were not dependent upon the "contin-
gent conditions of humanity,"32 but were instead "d priori simply in
the conceptions of pure reason. 3
The British empiricist philosophers rejected the transcendental
realm entirely and instead argued that all knowledge was derived
from experience of the physical world.' For the empiricists there
were no a priori concepts produced by reason or intellect alone.35 In-
stead, such concepts either could be broken down into simpler con-
cepts derived from experience or had no meaning at all.36
Although the empiricists rejected the transcendental realm, they
neither rejected reason nor denied that objective facts existed.3 7 In-
stead, they argued that knowledge should be acquired through the
methods of science.38 Thus, for the empiricists, rational scientific
knowledge accurately described objective reality.39
Traditional philosophy, then, for ancient, medieval, and modern
philosophers, has always relied on the use of reason to obtain knowl-
26. THOmAs Ao~m'As, TREATnsE ON LAw (Summa Theologica, QuESnONS 90-97) 44
(n.d.).
27. Id at 33.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id
30. Williams, supra note 23, at 435.
31. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 35
(T.K. Abbott trans., Prometheus Books 1987) (1785).
32. Id
33. Id at 11-12.
34. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 88.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id
39. See id.
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edge about an objective truth. Even the modem empiricist philoso-
phers, who rejected the metaphysics of the transcendental realm, did
not give up their faith in the objectivity of scientific observation.
III. THE RISE OF POSTMODERN TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE THEORY
Things fall apart: the center cannot hold .... 
40
Commenting on the world view of the postmodem mind, Huston
Smith has written: "[W]e are not more modest than our precursors;
we hang our arrogance in different quarters. Whereas our forebears
strike us as arrogant in the amount they thought they knew, we are
oppositely arrogant. '41 Thus, Smith implies that the transition from
the modem to the postmodern world view is one from arrogance
about knowledge, to arrogance about ignorance.
According to Joan Williams, "[t]raditional epistemology, with its
belief in the existence of transcendent, objective truth, has been re-
placed in the twentieth century by a 'new epistemology,' which rejects
a belief in objective truth and the claims of certainty that traditionally
follow."42 The postmodern world view does not consist solely of epis-
temology,43 but, as this section will demonstrate, reaches out to en-
compass every branch of philosophy-as well as other academic
disciplines such as mathematics, physics, anthropology, literary criti-
cism, and jurisprudence. Postmodernism does, however, begin with a
distinct epistemology, and then derives its other claims about the na-
ture and possibility of ultimate truth-what we might call its meta-
physics, or more properly its "anti-metaphysics"-from its
epistemology. 4
Through the following historical overview, the reader should be-
gin to get a sense of what the postmodern world view is, and why its
tenets present such a compelling challenge to traditional truth and
knowledge theory.
40. Yeats, supra note 1, at 1115.
41. HUSTON SMrH, The View From Everywhere, in BEYOND THE POST-MODERN MIND
17, 28 (1989).
42. Williams, supra note 23, at 430-31.
43. See supra note 15 (defining epistemology).
44. See supra note 14 (defining metaphysics). The postmodern position could be called
an anti-metaphysics because most postmodern theorists would deny that a metaphysics
could exist or be constructed. For a discussion of postmodern philosophy's denial of the
possibility of a metaphysics, see infra part II1.C-E.
April 1995] 1201
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A. The Demise of Traditional Science
* Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer .... 4-
Traditional Newtonian physics described a world where space,
time, and matter were absolutes, capable of being perceived and de-
scribed by the rational and unbiased scientist.4 6 In the Newtonian uni-
verse, events occurred in the three-dimensional space of Euclidian
geometry.47
In the late nineteenth century, developments in science and
mathematics began to call into question Euclidian geometry.48 Math-
ematicians eventually abandoned Euclid's system as inadequate to de-
scribe empirical reality.49 Kurt G~del's incompleteness theorem
"demonstrated that arithmetic cannot be both complete and internally
consistent."50 Gdel's theorem "played an important metaphorical
role... outside of math and physics," by reinforcing the notion that
"languages, including mathematics, are necessarily incomplete de-
scriptions of reality."51
These changes in mathematics led to dramatic changes in phys-
ics.52 Albert Einstein's theory of relativity rejected the Newtonian
concept of absolute time.5 3 The effect of the theory of relativity has
been described in the following way:
[T]he theory of relativity [required scientists] to abandon the
idea that there was a unique absolute time. Instead, each
observer would have his own measure of time as recorded by
a clock that he carried: clocks carried by different observers
would not necessarily agree. Thus time became a more per-
sonal concept, relative to the observer who measured it.5 4
The theory of relativity thus challenged the belief that the universe
was capable of a single, objective, description.5
45. YEATS, supra note 1, at 1115.
46. Williams, supra note 23, at 437.
47. Id at 437 n.45.
48. ML at 436-37.
49. Id at 437.
50. Id. at 439.
51. Id.
52. See id at 436-39.
53. STEPHEN W. HAwKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TimE: FROM THE BIG BANG TO
BLACK HOLES 20-21 (1988).
54. Id. at 143.
55. Williams, supra note 23, at 437-38.
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In addition, quantum mechanics also began to blur the traditional
scientific distinction between particles and waves by demonstrating
that particles often behave like waves, and waves like particles.
5 6
Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle proved that the present
position and velocity of a given particle could never be measured with
certainty, but could only be estimated based on probabilities. 57 Thus,
quantum mechanics demonstrated that
[i]n the world of the very small, where particle and wave as-
pects of reality are equally significant, things do not behave
in any way that we can understand from our experience of
the everyday world. It isn't just that [the traditional picture
of the] atom with its electron "orbits" is a false picture; all
pictures are false ....
Another blow to traditional science came with the work of his-
torians of science Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.5 9 Kuhn argued
that science was not a precise construction of theories on the basis of
neutral fact, but instead a socially contingent activity.60 Thus, for
Kuhn there was "no scientifically or empirically neutral system of lan-
guage or concepts"; instead scientific "tests and theories must proceed
from within one or another paradigm-based tradition."6 "
Feyerabend also argued that scientific progress was a myth, and
that there was no such thing as the scientific method.62 Both Kuhn
and Feyerabend "viewed scientific models as interpretations that were
dependent on the perspective of the observer.
63
56. JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRODINGER'S CAT.- QUANTUM PHYSICS AND RE-
ALrry 86-92 (1984); HAWKING, supra note 53, at 56.
57. HAWKING, supra note 53, at 54-56.
58. GRIBBIN, supra note 56, at 92. It seems open to debate whether the demise of
traditional physics actually has any implications for non-scientific disciplines, or for our
normal, everyday interactions with the world. For example, Heisenberg's uncertainty prin-
ciple tells me that I cannot know the exact location of a particle at any given time. HAWK-
ING, supra note 53, at 54-56. However, I would not try to walk through a door, instead of
opening it, simply because there is a theoretical chance that it would not be there.
59. Williams, supra note 23, at 455.
60. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 165-66; see Thomas Kuhn, The Resolution of
Revolutions, reprinted in A POSTMODERN READER 376, 377 (Joseph Natoli & Linda
Hutcheon eds., 1993).
61. Kuhn, supra note 60, at 378. Kuhn wrote that a scientist is "like the chess player
who, with a problem stated and the board physically or mentally before him, tries out
various alternative moves [that are] trials only of themselves, not of the rules of the game.
They are possible only so long as the paradigm itself is taken for granted." Id. at 377.
62. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 111.
63. Williams, supra note 23, at 455. Thus, for Kuhn, scientists who work within differ-
ent paradigms "practice their trades in different worlds .... Both are looking at the world
April 1995] 1203
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These scientific developments called into question traditional sci-
entific notions of "reality," "knowledge," and "objectivity."'64 Facts
were no longer fixed bits of reality, but instead moved and changed
with the position of the observer.65 Scientific observations were no
longer neutral observations of these facts, but instead were deter-
mined by the preconceptions of the scientist.66
B. The Rise of Culture
At the same time that scientists were reevaluating the basic tenets
of science, linguists and anthropologists were beginning to demon-
strate the contingent nature of linguistic and cultural categories.67
Linguist Benjamin Whorf argued that human beings have no access to
objective facts.68 Instead,
[w]e cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we
do, largely because, through our mother tongue, we are par-
ties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is
segmented in exactly that way for all to see. Languages dif-
fer not only in how they build their sentences but also in how
they break down nature to secure the elements to put in
those sentences.
69
Thus, Whorf argued that human perceptions were filtered
through the contingent categories of language. 70 Another linguist,
Ferdinand de Saussure, argued that language was a "system of signs"
that was "arbitrary and conventional," with "each sign defined not by
some essential property but by the differences which distinguish it
from other signs.
'71
.... But in some areas they see different things, and they see them in different relations
one to the other." Kuhn, supra note 60, at 381.
64. See Williams, supra note 23, at 436-39, 455.
65. Id.
66. Id at 455.
67. Id at 444-57.
68. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, Languages and Logic, reprinted in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT,
AND REALITY: SELECrED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 233,240 (John B. Carroll
ed., 1956) [hereinafter LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY].
69. Id.
70. Id. Whorf demonstrated, for example, that not everyone senses Western concepts
of space, time, and matter intuitively. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, An American Indian Model
of the Universe, reprinted in LANGUAGE, THOUGIIT, AND REALrrY, supra note 68, at 57.
Whorf's examination of the Hopi language demonstrated that the Hopis do not share the
Western belief in objectified time, but instead conceive of time in a manner more consis-
tent with relativity physics than with traditional Western conceptions. Id at 58.
71. Jonathan Culler, Jacques Derrida, in STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE: FROM L#,vi-
STRAUSS TO DERRIDA 154, 166 (John Surrock ed., 1979).
[Vol. 28:1197
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Anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz asserted that anthropo-
logical writings were not scientific analyses of objective facts, as tradi-
tionally had been claimed, but were instead only interpretations.72
For Geertz,
The concept of culture... is essentially a semiotic one....
Believing... that man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimen-
tal science in search of law but an interpretive one in search
of meaning.73
Thus, anthropologists "begin with [their] own interpretations of what
[their] informants are up to, or think they are up to, and then systema-
tize those."74 In this way, Geertz also stressed the location of the ob-
server as determinate of the nature of the reality observed.7
C. The Rise of Postmodern Philosophy
The ceremony of innocence is drowned .... 76
Postmodern philosophers have integrated the above insights from
linguistics, anthropology, and science into a postmodern view of a
world without rational knowledge or objective truth.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most influential postmodern phi-
losophers, "rejected the view that ... objective meanings are deter-
mined by reference to a reality outside language."77 For Wittgenstein,
"no single reality exists independently of the observer's interpreta-
tions.178 Culture, as a "web of human agreements," is the basis for
cognition, which is not related to an objective reality.79 Language has
no meaning in relation to an external reality, but instead has meaning
only in relation to the culture, or "form of life," in which the language
operates.80
72. Williams, supra note 23, at 455-57; see CLiFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: To-
ward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INm Pn-rAioN oF CuLauRs 3-30
(1973).
73. GEERTZ, supra note 72, at 5.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Williams, supra note 23, at 455-57.
76. Yeats, supra note 1, at 1115.
77. Williams, supra note 23, at 451. This is a very postmodern interpretation of
Wittgenstein's work. Wittgenstein's theory is complex, however, and the nature of the
correct interpretation is controversial.
78. Id. at 452.
79. Id. at 453.
80. I& at 452.
April 1995] 1205
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The certainty people feel about their language and perceptions is
a function, not of any correspondence with outside reality, but of
"pervasive and systematic agreements between people."' 81 This cer-
tainty comes from one's embeddedness in a particular "form of life,"'
a "nest of propositions" 83 that is the "inherited background against
which [one] distinguish[es] between true and false."
84
Wittgenstein argued that, "[t]o say of man ... that he knows
something; that what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth,
seems wrong to me.-It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmov-
ing foundation of his language-games." 8 5 Therefore, the "truth of cer-
tain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference, '86 not
to any consistency between empirical reality and our perceptions of it.
Thus, "it's not that on some points men know the truth with perfect
certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude."
87
Wittgenstein recognized, however, that "[our] language-game does
change with time,"8 so that "[a]t certain periods men find reasonable
what at other periods they found unreasonable."'89
Another philosopher who has contributed to the postmodern
world view is William V.0. Quine.90 Quine argued that the notion of
knowledge as a matter of resonance between words and the world
must be discarded.91 In its place, Quine substituted the notion of "ho-
lism."9 Under this theory, the truth of a statement was a function not
of its relationship to the world, but of its relationship to all other be-
liefs held to be true. 3 The result was that "[a]ny statement can be
81. Id. at 453.
82. LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, ON CERTANTY 46e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds. & Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969).
83. Id. at 30e.
84. Id. at i5e.
85. Id. at 52e.
86. Id. at 12e.
87. Id. at 52e.
88. Id. at 34e.
89. Id. at 43e.
90. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254,270-71
(1992); see Wn.LARD VAN OmAN QunE, WoRD AND OBIEcr (1960). This discussion of
Quine's theory is presented with the same reservation as the one expressed about Wittgen-
stein. See supra note 77 (discussing Wittgenstein's theory).
91. Patterson, supra note 90, at 270.
92. It
93. Id.
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held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments else-
where in the system."'94
Postmodern philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard also has rejected
the search for an objective truth, or "metanarrative," that can legiti-
mate and justify particular human institutions.95 For Lyotard, "legiti-
mation of first-order discourses (e.g., law and science) by resort to
second-order discourses of reason (e.g., philosophy) is replaced with a
picture of knowledge as a move within a game, specifically a 'lan-
guage-game.' "96
Thus, "Lyotard's principal focus in attacking the traditional con-
ception of knowledge as rational scrutiny of claims to truth and valid-
ity is philosophy. What Lyotard seeks is the complete displacement
(not replacement) of philosophy with knowledge of the pragmatics
of interaction."97 Lyotard argues that the use of philosophy as a
metanarrative to justify legal institutions must be abandoned.
98
Contemporary philosopher Richard Rorty agrees with Wittgen-
stein that "the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made
possible by special mental processes, and intelligible through a general
theory of representation, needs to be abandoned." 99 Rorty explains
that traditional philosophy has conceived of the mind as a "great mir-
ror" that is able to reflect accurate representations of the natural
world. 00
Although postmodern philosophy has shattered this theory of
knowledge, Rorty does not believe that this means a decline into rela-
tivism.'01 Instead, he argues for a revival of pragmatism, a "Deweyan
approach to both social science and morality, one which emphasizes
the utility of narratives and vocabularies rather than the objectivity of
laws and theories."102
94. WILLARD VAN ORmAN Qun, 7'wo Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL
Ponrr OF VIEw 20, 43 (1953).
95. Patterson, supra note 90, at 257 n.9. Thus, Lyotard "define[s] postmodern as incre-
dulity toward metanarratives." JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDIrrION:
A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE at xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
96. Patterson, supra note 90, at 257 n.9.
97. Id.
98. I.
99. RicHARD RORTY, PImosoPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATUfRE 6 (1979).
100. Id. at 12.
101. Id. at 13.
102. RicIARD RoRTY, Method, Social Science and Social Hope, in CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM 191, 195 (1982). John Dewey, along with Charles Sanders Peirce and Wil-
liam James, are the main figures of the school of philosophy known as pragmatism. Martha
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CA. L. Rv. 1597, 1610 (1990).
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A pragmatist, according to Rorty, "drops the notion of truth as
correspondence with reality altogether, and says that [for example]
modem science does not enable us to cope because it corresponds, it
just plain enables us to cope."'1 3 Thus, for such a pragmatist, the cri-
teria for the adoption of a new theory would not be whether the the-
ory is true, but instead whether it "enables us to cope."'1 4 Rorty
argues that we should adopt his pragmatic view of truth, not if we
believe that it is actually true-since the question of what is actually
true is "not a profitable topic"' 05 -but rather if we believe that it "is a
good thing to try for."'0 6
Rorty does not address the question of how we can determine
what is a "good thing to try for"'" 7 once we have accepted the prag-
matist view that "there is ... no criterion that we have not created in
the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is not
an appeal to such a criterion, [and] no rigorous argumentation that is
not obedience to our own conventions.' 0 8
These postmodem philosophers often seem to move directly from
the theory that we are unable to know things objectively, to the con-
clusion that objective reality itself does not exist.'0 9 The postmodern
story goes something like this: We cannot know objective reality-
postmodern epistemology; therefore, such reality does not exist-
postmodern anti-metaphysics. However, if the ultimate nature of re-
ality is "no-reality," isn't this a metaphysics as well?" 0
The jump from no-knowledge to no-reality may seem logical and
inevitable for some postmodern philosophers, but I would argue that
this is hardly so."' Just because we cannot know or see reality cer-
tainly does not mean that it does not exist. Only if we hold out our
Pragmatists explore the consequences and practical effects of conceptions when exploring
truth, meaning, and action. Id.
103. RicHARD RORTY, Introduction to CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note
102, at xvii [hereinafter RoRTY, Introduction].
104. Id.
105. Id. at xliii.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at xlii.
109. See, eg., WrrrGENSTEiN, supra note 82, at 12e ("The truth of certain empirical
propositions belongs to our frame of reference .... ."); QuiNE, supra note 94, at 43 ("Any
statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments else-
where in the system.").
110. For a definition of metaphysics, see supra note 14.
111. Wittgenstein himself may have questioned this when he wrote "Is God bound by
our knowledge?... For that is what we want to say." WrrENSTEIN, supra note 82, at
57e.
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own minds as the measure of ultimate reality does ultimate reality
disappear when we find our minds not up to the task of grasping it
with certainty. The idea that anything our minds cannot grasp cannot
exist is a very anthropocentric idea-as if we were creators of the uni-
verse through our thought processes"
12
D. The Deconstruction of Philosophical and Literary Texts
The idea of "deconstruction" generally is associated with the
French philosopher Jacques Derrida.113 Derrida argues that all philo-
sophical theories are versions of a single system, a system that we can-
not escape, but that can be critiqued only from within by reversing the
hierarchies that it has established." 4
Derrida calls this system "logocentrism" or the "metaphysics of
presence."" 5 He has written that "[t]he history of metaphysics" is
based on "the determination of being as presence in all the senses of
this word.... [A]U the names related to fundamentals, to principles
... have always designated the constant of a presence ... 2,116 Thus,
for Derrida, traditional philosophy always has conceived of reality as a
series of present states, so that the reality of A is made to depend on
the fact that A is present at time X, at time Y, and again at time Z-
its existence is a series of present states." 7
The problem with the metaphysics of presence is that any account
of what is happening at a given instant requires references to other
instants that are not present."" For example, the motion of an object
is only conceivable insofar as every instant-every present state-is
already marked with traces of the past and the future.119
A similar problem arises with language. Derrida accepts the lin-
guist Saussure s20 conception of language as a process of differentia-
112. The philosopher Ren6 Descartes argued that he could be sure of his own existence
only because of the existence of his mind, which was able to reason. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 14, at 74. He argued that it was self-evident that nothing could reason without ex-
isting, so he must exist. Id. In addition, Descartes argued that God existed because he was
able to conceive of the idea of God. Id. Descartes believed that he would not be able to
conceive of a perfect Supreme Being unless one actually existed. Id at 75.
113. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 71.
114. Culler, supra note 71, at 154.
115. Id.
116. Jacques Derrida, Structure; Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,
reprinted in A POSTMODERN READER, supra note 60, at 223, 225.
117. See Culler, supra note 71, at 162.
118. Id. at 161-62.
119. Id. at 162-63.
120. See infra part IlI.B for a discussion of Saussure.
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tion, wherein one word is differentiated from other words with
different meanings.121 No word has an inherent meaning, but instead
its meaning is totally relational."2 The meaning of a word when it is
spoken, then, is marked by the traces of other words that one is not
uttering.' Thus, "no element can function as a sign without referring
to another element which itself is not simply present," 24 and no sign
can be "present in and of itself, referring only to itself.' 12 In this way,
Derrida shows that while the metaphysics of presence posits a reality
that can be fully present at any one time, such a reality cannot exist.' 26
One main feature of logocentrism, for Derrida, is the "logic of
supplementarity."' 27 This supplementarity has been described as fol-
lows: "Derrida shows that prior metaphysical, epistemological, ethical
and logical systems have been constructed on the basis of conceptual
oppositions such as transcendental/empirical, internal/external, origi-
nal/derivative, good/evil, universal/particular. One of the terms in
each binary set is privileged, the other suppressed or excluded."'1
Deconstruction, then, is the process of reconsidering this hierar-
chy by inverting it, and "show[ing] that what were conceived as the
distinguishing characteristics of the marginal are in fact the defining
qualities of the central object of consideration."'12 9 "By analysing the
denigrated or marginalized terms and the nature of their exclusion,
Derrida demonstrates that the preference for one term over its oppo-
site is ultimately untenable: the privileged term has meaning only in
so far as it is contrasted with its ostensibly excluded opposite.'1
30
Derrida recognizes that the deconstructive critique of logocentr-
ism itself cannot escape logocentrism; it only can remain within the
system and continue to reveal contradictions and paradoxes by revers-
ing hierarchies and showing that there is no metaphysical reason for
the privileging of one term and the denigrating of its opposite. 131 Der-
rida has written:
121. Culler, supra note 71, at 166.
122. Id.
123. See JACQUES DERRIDA, Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kris-
teva, in PosrrioNs 15, 29 (Alan Bass trans., 1981).
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id.
126. See Culler, supra note 71, at 161-64.
127. Id. at 168.
128. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 72.
129. Culler, supra note 71, at 168.
130. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 72.
131. Culler, supra note 71, at 154.
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There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphys-
ics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language-
no syntax and no lexicon-which is alien to this history; we
cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not
already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit pos-
tulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.
132
Because "we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without
also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity,"'
133
we must continue to use
all these old concepts, while at the same time exposing here
and there their limits, treating them as tools which can still
be of use. No longer is any truth-value attributed to them
.... [Instead] ... they are employed to destroy the old
* machinery to which they belong and of which they them-
selves are pieces.' 4
Deconstruction in philosophy, then, "does not consist in turning the
page of philosophy ... but in continuing to read philosophers in a
certain way.' 5
Similarly, deconstruction in literary criticism attempts to reveal
the contradictions and paradoxes in literary works. 36 A decon-
structive reading of a literary text "starts from the premise that all
texts reflect [a] belief in objective truth .... [It then goes on to]
deconstruct this metaphysics by revealing how the text undermines its
own claims to truth and by showing that its meaning is in fact
contingent."'137
Derrida's work also focuses on the indeterminacy of language.
138
This indeterminacy stems from two sources. First, the meaning of any
word cannot be truly present at any given time, but instead carries
traces of excluded words. 139 In addition, any word is repeatable-
what Derrida calls "iterable"-by any speaker. 40 In this process of
repetition, the meaning of a word inevitably changes.' 41
132. Derrida, supra note 116, at 226.
133. Id at 227.
134. Id. at 230.
135. Ld. at 235.
136. Williams, supra note 23, at 461.
137. Id.
138. See Culler, supra note 71, at 164, 171.
139. Id. at 164.
140. Id. at 171.
141. See id.; infra part IV.D (discussing Drucilla Cornell's argument that indeterminacy
of language stems from its iterability).
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The consequence of this indeterminacy is that reality itself is in-
determinate because we are capable of perceiving and describing real-
ity only within language.142 This is not something to be feared; instead
Derrida recommends a "Nietzschean affirmation-the joyous affirma-
tion of the freeplay of the world and without truth, without origin,
offered to an active interpretation."'143
The indeterminacy of language has political consequences as well,
since it disables totalitarianism by denying that totalitarian authority
can ever fix the meaning of language, and thereby dictate one accepta-
ble truth.'" In addition, once the oppositions of logocentrism have
been deconstructed, we no longer can claim a monopoly on truth for
the privileged term in a binary set by excluding the marginalized
term.' 45 According to Derrida, the exclusion of the marginalized term
involves violence:
we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-d-
vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two
terms governs the other ...or has the upper hand. To
deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hier-
archy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of over-
turning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating
structure of opposition.
46
E. Postmodern Approaches to Truth and Knowledge Theory
The legal theorists discussed in the next section of this Comment
do not simply advocate one uniform concept of postmodern theory.
147
Instead, each has his or her own spin on what type of change
142. Culler, supra note 71, at 166.
143. Derrida, supra note 116, at 240.
144. Other postmodern philosophers and critics have also argued that the drive to find
"the truth" hides a totalitarian impulse. For example, Zygmunt Bauman writes that
[w]here one cannot do without the "well grounded concept of truth" is when it
comes to tell others that they are in error and hence (1) ought or must change
their minds, thus (2) confirming the superiority (read: right to command) of the
holder of truth (read: the giver of command). The bid for truth as a claimed
quality of knowledge arises therefore solely in the context of hegemony and pros-
elytism... [where] one refuses to coexist peacefully and respect the existing bor-
ders .... Truth is, in other words, a social relation ... an aspect of a hierarchy...
a bid for domination-through-hegemony.
Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodemity, or Living with Ambivalence, reprinted in A
POSTMODERN READER, supra note 60, at 9, 10-11.
145. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 72.
146. JAcOUEs DERRMA, Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy
Scarpetta, in PosMoNs, supra note 123, at 37, 41.
147. See infra part IV.
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postmodemism demands of our traditional world view, and what the
consequences of postmodernism are for legal theory.
In order to help the reader better understand these different vari-
eties of postmodemism, this section presents an outline of possibilities
for postmodern theory. When developing this outline, I began with a
traditional conception of truth and knowledge theory: that both tran-
scendent truth and transcendent knowledge exist.
148
"Transcendent truth" means simply truth that exists indepen-
dently of what we think about it-truth that we cannot think away,
and that would not be constrained by the extent to which our cogni-
tion is socially constructed. The term transcendent truth as used in
this Comment includes "transcendental" truth developed through the
use of reason, as well as "empirical" truth developed from observation
and experience of the external world. 14 9 Therefore, even the philoso-
phy of the British empiricists"50 would be committed to both transcen-
dent truth and transcendent knowledge according to my definition of
the term.
"Transcendent knowledge" simply means knowledge of transcen-
dent truth, which is able to "transcend" our particular contingent so-
cial situation. Thus, the terms transcendent truth and transcendent
knowledge, as used in this Comment, should not be confused with
concepts from the "transcendental idealism" of Immanuel Kant.' 5'
Faced with the postmodern challenge, a traditional theorist who
advocates both transcendent truth and transcendent knowledge could
concede a little by agreeing with the postmoderns that our social situ-
atedness makes our knowledge of transcendent truth "biased." This
concession still would not make the theory genuinely postmodern,
however, as traditional knowledge theory has conceded that persons
may be biased in their knowledge. 52 In addition, the concept of bias
148. See supra part II.
149. For an example of these types of truth theory, see supra part II.
150. See supra part II.
151. For Kant, empirical reality was uncertain, but by using logic one could form "tran-
scendental" mental concepts that were a priori-that is, before empirical experience or
observation of the world. These concepts included scientific concepts such as "causation"
and moral concepts such as Kant's own "categorical imperative." ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 14, at 156-64.
152. For example, philosopher JUrgen Habermas, a staunch defender of traditional truth
theory, acknowledges that we have "egocentric or ethnocentric perspectives," but believes
that through "unrestrained communication" we can "bring[ ] to the fore the deepest force
of reason, which enables us to overcome [these biases] and reach an expanded ... view."
Mitchell Stephens, The Theologian of Talk, L.A. Tims, Oct. 23, 1994 (Magazine), at 26,30
(quoting interview with JArgen Habermas).
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presupposes the possibility of rational knowledge of an objective truth
from which the biased knowledge deviates.'5 3
The next step for the theorist would be to hang on to transcen-
dent truth, but to concede transcendent knowledge entirely, and re-
place it with embedded, socially constructed knowledge.154 In this
scenario, there would still be an objective reality out there, but we
would not be capable of seeing it because we would only be able to
"see" using the socially constructed tools of our language and cultural
community.'5 5 Thus, we would have no way to test the congruence of'
our "reality" with the true transcendent reality or truth. Transcendent
truth might as well not even exist, as we would not be capable of see-
ing it.
As noted earlier, however, many postmodern philosophers go di-
rectly from the concession that knowledge is socially constructed to
the conclusion that transcendent truth does not exist at all.' 5 This
would be the next step for the theorist: If she really were convinced
by the postmoderns, she then would advocate that transcendent truth
and knowledge are nonexistent, and we are left with only socially con-
structed, embedded knowledge, and contingent, relative "truths" spe-
cific to our own forms of life. 5 7
This Comment presents an outline of all of the possibilities open
to the theorist below. In the outline, "partial" postmodernism is
postmodernism which retains transcendent truth, as it posits less
extreme consequences from the social construction of some or all
knowledge. "Total" postmodernism throws out transcendent truth al-
together, as this form of postmodernism begins with the social con-
struction of knowledge and pushes it to the extreme conclusion that
there is no transcendent reality at all.
The outline is as follows:
1. Traditional theory
a. transcendent truth, transcendent knowledge
b. transcendent truth, biased knowledge
2. Partial postmoderism
a. transcendent truth, socially embedded knowledge
153. The word "bias" is defined as "such a prepossession with some.., point of view
that the mind does not respond impartially." WEBsTER'S TmRD NEw IMMRNATONAL
DICTIONARY 211 (1976) [hereinafter WEBSMR'S].
154. See supra part H.B-D.
155. See supra part III.B-D.
156. See supra part HI.C.
157. See supra part III.B-D.
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3. Total postmodernism
a. no transcendent truth, socially embedded
knowledge
The next section discusses the work of four postmodern theorists:
Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Minow, Drucilla Cornell, and Stanley
Fish.158 MacKinnon, Minow, and Cornell specifically discuss feminism
in their work on legal theory, while Fish focuses on legal theory in
general.'5 9 I have included Fish here because his vision of the effect
of postmodernism on traditional legal theory is very extreme and dif-
ferent from that of the other theorists, thus providing a useful
comparison. 60
The discussion to follow analyzes where in my outline these theo-
rists would place themselves, and where, in my view, they actually fit.
This exploration of their work eventually will require some reconsid-
eration and modification of the outline. Therefore, the above outline
should be considered preliminary.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF POSTMODERNISM AND LEGAL THEORY
A. Martha Minow's Contexts and Perspectives
In her insightful article Justice Engendered,'6' Martha Minow
writes about the "dilemma of difference" 62 that the Supreme Court
faces "[i]n a society of diversity with legacies of discrimination, within
a polity committed to self-governance, [where] the judiciary becomes
a critical arena for demands of inclusion."'
1 63
Minow focuses chiefly on the way this "dilemma of difference" is
inevitably framed from various "points of view."'' "[L]ink[ing]
problems of difference to questions of vantage point,"'6 she argues
that any "objective stance" will undoubtedly "appear partial from an-
other point of view."' 66 This is because no "objective" point of view
can exist. 6 7 Minow quotes Hillary Putnam, who argues that "[t]here
is no God's Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine;
there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting
158. See infra part IV.A-D.
159. See works by these theorists cited infra part IV.A-D.
160. See infra part IV.C.
161. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987).
162. Id. at 12, 17-31.
163. Id. at 93.
164. Id. at 12-14.
165. Id at 14.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 14-15.
April 1995] 1215
1216 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories
subserve."'
1 68
For Minow this embeddedness in perspective is not imprison-
ment, however, because persons are able to shift from one perspective
to another.169 She makes this clear by stating in the dedication at the
beginning of her article that "[f]or resolving any doubts about the pos-
sibility that people can take the perspective of another, the author
thanks [various persons]."'17
Although persons are free to choose which perspective they will
adopt in a given situation, they are not able to free themselves from
having a perspective.' 7 1 "Once we see that any point of view, includ-
ing one's own, is a point of view, we will realize that every difference
we see is seen in relation to something already assumed as the starting
point.'
'172
Since there is no escape from perspective itself, the "task for
judges is to identify vantage points, to learn how to adopt contrasting
vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to embrace in
given circumstances." 73 This will engage judges in "struggles over de-
scriptions of reality" that constitute the various perspectives. 174
This exploration of other perspectives is qualified by a warning:
A judge must also remember that although she can enrich her under-
standing through taking on different vantage points, "no one can see
fully from another's point of view."" In other words, no one can
fully imagine what it is like to walk in another's shoes-perspective
shifting can never totally capture the perspective of others.
Minow next explores how "some [Supreme Court] Justices, on
some occasions, have tried to see beyond the dominant perspective
and reach an alternative construction of reality. In many other in-
stances, however, the Justices presume that the perspective they adopt
is either universal or superior to others.' 76 Because no perspective
can be truly universal, when the Justices "fail to acknowledge their
168. Id. at 14 n.18 (quoting HmLARY PuTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HIsToRY 50
(1981)).
169. Id. at 10 n.* (introductory footnote).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 15.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. Id. at 16.
175. Id. at 32.
176. Id. at 53-54.
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own perspective and its influence on the assignment of difference,' 77
they assume that "all other perspectives are either presumptively
identical to [their] own or are irrelevant.
'178
These assumptions are easy to fall into because when one is a
member of a powerful or dominant group it is more difficult to see
one's ideologies as mere perspective. 179 "The more powerful we are,
the less we may be able to see that the world coincides with our view
precisely because we shaped it in accordance with those views. That is
just one of our privileges."' 0 The viewpoint of the powerful coincides
with the world because
[t]he winning views about what differences matter and why
they matter acquire the earmarks of factuality.... Ideologi-
cal success is achieved when only dissenting views are re-
garded as ideologies; the prevailing view is the truth.
... Accordingly, political and cultural success itself sub-
merges the fact that conceptions of reality represent a per-
spective of some groups, not a picture of reality free from
any perspective. 8 1
Minow's exhortation to the Supreme Court Justices, and "all
[others] who judge,"'" then, is this:
It may be ultimately impossible to take the perspective of
another completely, but the effort to do so may help [you]
recognize that [your] perspective is partial.... After shaking
free of these unstated assumptions and developing a sense of
alternate perspectives, [you] must then choose. The process
of looking through other perspectives does not itself yield an
answer, but it may lead to an answer different from the one
that [you] would otherwise have reached.8 3
Minow argues that judges must stop "treat[ing] other points of
view as irritants in the way of [their] vision" and "hanging on to faulty
certainty."'8 Instead, judges first must acknowledge partiality in their
own views, and then must choose "which partial view to advance or
accept."'18 5
177. I& at 50.
178. Id
179. Id. at 73.
180. Id (footnote omitted).
181. IM at 66-67 (footnotes omitted).
182. Id at 15.
183. Id at 60.
184. Id at 75.
185. I&
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This choosing, of course, is the hard part, and Minow gives
judges little guidance regarding the principles that should govern the
choosing or rejecting of viewpoints. She notes that although "[g]iven
the relationship between knowledge and power, those with less privi-
lege may well see better than those with more[,]' 18 6 always choosing
the standpoint of the oppressed or "different" may "deny the multiple
experiences of members of the denigrated group and create a new
claim of essentialism."'187 Therefore, instead of creating a new "stand-
point theory" from the point of view of the oppressed, judges need to
"strive for the standpoint of someone who is committed to the moral
relevance of contingent particulars.'
' 88
Whose standpoint is that of a person who sees all of these "con-
tingent particulars"? Minow does not really answer this question. It
may be that this perspective of contingent particulars is simply the
perspective of any person who has honestly tried to embrace different
perspectives and to learn from what each perspective has to contrib-
ute. Minow says "exercises in taking the perspective of the other will
deepen and broaden anyone's perspective.,
89
Does this attention to perspective mean that we must give up
general concepts and principles? Not at all. According to Minow,
"immersion in particulars does not require the relinquishment of gen-
eral commitments. The struggle is not over the validity of principles
and generalizations-it is over which ones should prevail in a given
context."'190
Minow elaborates on the idea of "context" in an article written
with Elizabeth V. Spelman entitled In Context.'9' Minow and Spel-
man focus on context "in order to expose how apparently neutral and
universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share
the characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, hetero-
sexual, adult men for whom those rules were actually written." 92
Reading through their article, one gets the impression that the
authors use the term "context" similarly to the way Minow uses the
word "perspective" in Justice Engendered. 93 The authors state that
"[a]rguments over context... may wrongly imply that we can ever
186. Id. at 86.
187. Id. at 76.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 81.
190. Id. at 92 (footnotes omitted).
191. Minow & Spelman, supra note 102.
192. d. at 1601.
193. Minow, supra note 161.
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escape context. We will argue instead that we are always in some con-
text. ' 194 While "the selection of some context is unavoidable," 195 it is
possible to "switch from one context to another-from one level of
analysis to another, or from a focus on one set of traits or concerns to
a focus on another set. ' 1 9 6 In other words, while context cannot be
transcended, we can jump from one context to another-we are not
totally embedded in our own context.
The authors describe and respond to the various objections that
have been made to contextual thinking. 197 They first address the ar-
gument that contextual thinking undermines the foundations for the
exercise of judgment, and that "[a]bsent foundations for knowledge
and judgment, there are no bases for holding those who wield power
to account, much less for constraining their own political preferences
and prejudices."' 98
The authors respond to this criticism by arguing that emphasis on
context does not engender relativism because a commitment to con-
text merely requires one to refrain from judging until one has ex-
amined all of the relevant contexts and looked at the situation from all
of the relevant perspectives. 199 "Principles such as equality, fairness,
and freedom can be defended and even fulfilled in light of contextual-
ized assessments of the limitations of particular rules, given the frames
of references of their authors and their expositors and given evidence
of the actual effects of rules on people."200 Thus, "[t]he basic norm of
fairness-treat like cases alike-is fulfilled, not undermined, by atten-
tion to what particular traits make one case like, or unlike,
another. ,
201
In addition, the authors argue that those who advocate "abstrac-
tion are themselves situated in particular ways of knowing that limit
their understandings.... Arguments and principles presented as if
they came from no situation still sit within the contexts of their au-
thors and readers."'2  These supposedly "objective" arguments ob-
194. Minow & Spelman, supra note 191, at 1605.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1615-39.
198. Id at 1618.
199. Id at 1634-39.
200. Id. at 1632; see also Minow, supra note 161, at 92 (arguing that emphasis on per-
spective "does not require the relinquishment of general commitments").
201. Minow & Spelman, supra note 191, at 1629.
202. Id. at 1627.
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scure the point of view from which they were made, giving them a
false legitimacy.
203
The authors also address another objection to context: that the
focus on context will emphasize the particular situations of particular
individuals and obscure important commonalities between persons,
such as those of race, class, and gender.2 4 The argument is that such
an emphasis is depoliticizing because it makes "less legitimate the
processes of abstraction by which [a group's] members [come] to be
able to see and name what they [have] in common [and] thereby
pull[ ] the rug out from under their motivation for and hopes for polit-
ical change.
'20 5
The authors respond by arguing that the postmodern focus on
context has usually been used to emphasize, not every possible feature
of a person or situation, but instead previously neglected traits, such
as race, class, and gender. 0 6 Therefore, "[t]he attention to particular-
ity that aims to highlight people subject to domination is not an un-
thinking immersion in overwhelming detail, but instead a sustained
inquiry into the structures of domination in our society.... [And] can
provide grounds for judgment of good and evil."207 The question then
"becomes which context should matter, what traits or aspects of the
particular should be addressed, how wide should the net be cast
in collecting the details, and what scale should be used to weigh
them?,
208
The last section of the Minow and Spelman article attempts to
demonstrate how thinking "in context" would work in dealing with a
concrete, contextual issue-the question of whether "children who al-
lege that they are victims of child abuse must testify in open court,
facing the alleged abuser."209 The authors first examine how the
Supreme Court Justices have either adopted or ignored the various
contexts that could be invoked to understand this situation.210 They
note that the Court has only indirectly addressed the context of the
child witness called to testify.
211
203. See id. at 1627-28.
204. Id. at 1622-23.
205. Id. at 1623.
206. See id. at 1629.
207. Id. at 1633.
208. Id. at 1629.
209. Id. at 1639.
210. Id. at 1639-44.
211. Id. at 1643.
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The authors recommend consideration of a "contextual" rule of
judicial decision making that would allow the decision maker to "eval-
uate individual cases in order to assess whether to permit child testi-
mony in the absence of direct face-to-face confrontation." '12 Such an
approach would not be a form of relativism, but instead a "refined
sense of what factors should count in judgment, not an abandonment
of the possibility of judgment.
'" 213
Following this approach, a judge would immerse herself "in a va-
riety of contexts that different people believe are relevant to [the]
given problem. 2 14 The judge also would "examine the expression of
larger patterns of power, domination, and exclusion in the particular
details of each context.
'2 15
Minow's concern with both context and perspective underscores
her embrace of postmodern knowledge theory; what she calls "the
situatedness of human beings who know, argue, justify, judge, and
act. '21 6 Minow's postmodern knowledge is interesting, however, be-
cause Minow asserts that it is possible to shift from perspective to per-
spective, 1 7 and from context to context.21 8
Minow's judge seems to have accepted some of the lessons of
postmodern philosophy, but not to have taken the postmodern
message to the extreme. While her judge does not reject abstract
ideas like justice and rights, she does use the exercise of taking on
different perspectives to see the case in context, thereby making her-
self more sensitive to the litigants in the particular case.219 The ques-
tion remains, however, whether all this context jumping and
perspective shifting will really provide a judge with better tools to de-
cide a case than the traditional tools of legal reasoning.
Why does Minow's judge not take the lessons of the social con-
struction of all knowledge to the extreme and argue that perspective
shifting is not possible? Perhaps because Minow senses that such an
extreme postmodern view endangers the whole concept of judging.
This is because judging presupposes some sort of transcendent reason-
ing. After all, how would one go about shifting from one's own per-
spective to that of another? One would investigate the reality of
212. Id. at 1646.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1647.
216. Id. at 1649.
217. Minow, supra note 161, at 10 n.* (introductory footnote).
218. Minow & Spelman, supra note 191, at 1605.
219. Id.
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another's perspective by analogizing that person's experience to the
only experiences one has access to-one's own experiences. This pro-
cess of analogy-that is, comparing dissimilar experiences and per-
spectives-would seem to be impossible without at least some type of
transcendent knowledge to link the two perspectives.
Without such an ability to abstract, each person would be totally
trapped in perspective. A judge would have no way to decide cases
because, if knowledge is totally embedded, everyone is right and de-
serves to win. That is, from litigant A's perspective, she is right and
deserves to win. From litigant B's perspective, she is right and de-
serves to win. Since the highest form of knowledge is embedded per-
spective, and there are no transcendent principles to judge who really
is right, we must conclude either that both are right, or that both are
wrong-it doesn't really matter which decision the judge makes.
Each person is equally right in a world where everyone is right from
their own perspective.
In addition, there would be no moral justification for giving def-
erence to the judge's perspective over the perspective of one of the
litigants-except that it has the power of the state behind it. If every-
thing is just perspective, there is no reason to treat the judge's per-
spective on the problem at hand as any more justified than that of
either of the litigants.
Indeed, there is no better rationale for having a judge decide dis-
putes than for having all litigants decide disputes by force, or having
all litigants with names beginning with A through F always win their
cases, or deciding cases by a lottery. If knowledge is totally embed-
ded, then judges do not exist, at least not as we conceive of them.
It is difficult to construct Minow's truth theory. Although she ad-
vocates an embedded theory of knowledge-albeit with perspective
shifting-she says nothing about the possibility, or impossibility, of
transcendent truth. She does state that when looking at things in con-
text, or from various perspectives, one still can use general principles
such as equality and justice.10 It seems for Minow, then, that such
principles might have justification independent of any particular
perspective.
If Minow's judge heard a case where the perspective of one of the
participants denied the importance of the general principles of justice
and equality, I think that Minow probably would argue that this par-
ticipant's perspective should not govern as to the application of those
220. Minow, supra note 161, at 92.
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principles 2' Her argument against allowing this participant's per-
spective to govern would only make sense, however, if the principles
of justice and equality have importance apart from perspective-that
is, importance in and of themselves.
Minow might argue, however, that these principles should be
used, and the perspective of the participant who denies them disre-
garded, simply because these general principles form the foundations
of the U.S. constitutional system-the legal system in which Minow
probably supposes these judges to be working. She might argue that
these general principles have reflected certain partial perspectives, but
that because our people have found worth in them in the past-
enough worth to inscribe them into our constitutional fabric-we
should continue to apply them. In this scenario, Minow would not be
denying that these general principles are partial, but rather would be
justifying their use by citing tradition or a history of practical benefits
that these principles have been able to achieve for groups of persons
with varying perspectives.
This would be a pragmatic argument for the retaining of general
principles.' 2 If Minow adopted such an argument, she would be argu-
ing for general principles not because they have any relation to tran-
scendent truth, but simply because they have worked well in the past.
But from whose perspective would Minow decide whether these prin-
ciples worked well? Whose criteria would she use? Even a pragmatic
argument seems to require some yardstick by which working well is
judged.
And Minow definitely has an idea about how society could work
better than it presently does. The language of feminism, as well as
many other "isms," runs through her work.' 2 How can she advocate
feminism, even on a pragmatic level, without retaining the yardstick of
transcendent truth to justify her choice of feminism over the current
"structures of domination in our society"224?
I believe that Minow retains feminism as a bit of transcendent
truth by which our societal and legal systems are judged. Minow is
thus a partial postmodernist who embraces the postmodern lesson of
221. Cf. i. (stating that emphasis on perspective "does not require the relinquishment
of general commitments"); Minow & Spelman, supra note 191, at 1632 ("[p]rinciples such
as equality, fairness, and freedom can be defended").
222. For a definition of pragmatism, see supra note 102.
223. Minow & Spelman, supra note 191, at 1601 ("neutral and universal rules [exclude
persons other than] privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men").
224. Id. at 1633.
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embedded knowledge in her perspectives and contexts, but retains
some sort of transcendent truth in her general feminist principles.
B. Catharine MacKinnon's Women's Standpoint
Catharine MacKinnon's legal theory is a feminist critique of the
patriarchal status quo based on marxist analysis." 5 MacKinnon sees
the relationship between the sexes much like a marxist would see the
relationship between the classes-one of power, domination, and
oppression. z 6
One of the core themes in her work is the thesis that "the social
relation between the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and
women must submit and this relation is sexual-in fact, is sex. ' 22 7 Be-
cause sexuality is "whatever a given society eroticizes," 228 "[s]exual
violence can no longer be categorized away as violence not sex ....
When acts of dominance and submission, up to and including acts of
violence, are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex itself, that is
what they are .... Violence is sex when it is practiced as sex."229
In this analysis, "[r]ape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse
of children, prostitution, and pornography... form a distinctive pat-
tern: the power of men over women in society."2 0 This pattern of
sexual violence perpetuates a system where "[a]ggression against
those with less power is experienced as sexual pleasure, an entitlement
of masculinity. For the female, subordination is sexualized, in the way
that dominance is for the male, as pleasure as well as gender identity,
as femininity."231 What MacKinnon attempts is to shatter the ideol-
225. MacKinnon writes:
Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most one's own,
yet most taken away ....
... As work is to marxism, sexuality to feminism is socially constructed yet
constructing, universal as activity yet historically specific .... As the organized
expropriation of the work of some for the benefit of others defines a class, work-
ers, the organized expropriation of the sexuality of some for the use of others
defines the sex, woman.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3 (1989) [here-
inafter MACKINNON, FEMiNIST STATE]. For MacKinnon, however, feminism is ultimately
more important than marxism, as feminism is marxism's "final conclusion and ultimate
critique" and "turns marxism inside out and on its head." Id. at 125.
226. Id. at 4.
227. MAcKINNoN, Introduction, supra note 3, at 3.
228. CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 46, 53 [hereinafter MAcKmNoN, Desire and Power].
229. MAcKINNON, Introduction, supra note 3, at 6.
230. Id. at 5.
231. Id. at 6-7.
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ogy that these actions are deviant or personal choices, and to show
that they are integral to the system of patriarchy 3 2
Pornography is the ultimate expression of this system of sexual
dominance . 3 3 In pornography, women are portrayed simply as "fluck-
ees," existing only to be fucked: "Man fucks woman; subject verb ob-
ject." 4 Because pornography instills a false consciousness in women
as well as men, women often become sexually aroused by their own
degradation 3 5 Thus, pornography, as a facet of the patriarchal sys-
tem, "has the political genius of making everybody potentially com-
plicit through the stirring between their legs,"23 6 and invading one of
the most intimate and personal aspects of a woman's life.237 However,
from the feminist standpoint, a "good fuck" is no compensation for
"getting fucked" by the system, just as the fact that a worker has a
good day on the job is no compensation for that worker's exploitation
and alienation under the capitalist system
2 38
For MacKinnon, traditional liberal feminism's emphasis on gen-
der differences only obscures the fact that "[t]he differences we attri-
bute to sex are lines inequality draws. 239 Such an emphasis makes a
system of oppression look "falsely symmetrical," and in this way
"[d]ifference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination.' °
For this reason feminist jurisprudence must give up the tradi-
tional focus on "difference" and adopt MacKinnon's "dominance ap-
proach."24 Instead of trying to make rules that fit the reality of
sexual "difference," the dominance approach tries to change a "poli-
tics [that] construct[s] the deep structure of society," and that "system-
atic[ally] relegat[es] ... an entire group of people to a condition of
inferiority and attribut[es] it to their nature."'242
For MacKinnon, society is an expression of the male point of
view of reality.?4 3 Indeed, "[f]eminism has revealed nature and soci-
ety to be mirrors of each other: the male gender looking at itself look-
232. Id. at 7.
233. MAcKnNON, FEMINsT STATE, supra note 225, at 195-214.
234. Id. at 124.
235. See MAcKINNON, Introduction, supra note 3, at 15.
236. Id.
237. MAcKiNNON, FErNisT STATE, supra note 225, at 94.
238. MAcKnNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 60-61.
239. MAcKNNON, Introduction, supra note 3, at 8.
240. Id.
241. CATHARINE A. MAcKnNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,
in FEMINSM UNMODIFED, supra note 3, at 32, 32-45.
242. Id. at 41.
243. MAcKNNON, Introduction, supra note 3, at 16.
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ing at itself."244 Feminism, then, is important because it "take[s]
women's situation seriously from women's standpoint." 245 Feminism's
"methodological secret" is that it "is built on believing women's ac-
counts of sexual use and abuse by men." 6 "The feminist theory of
knowledge begins with the theory of the point of view of all women on
social life." 247 Feminists "criticize male pursuits from women's point
of view, from the standpoint of our social experience as women." 8
"Woman's commonality, which includes our diversity, comes
from our shared social position."24 9 This position is social, not biologi-
cal, because "there is too much variance in women's status, role, and
treatment for it to be biological, and too little variance for it to [be]
individual."2 0 "The commonality is that, despite real changes, bot-
tom is bottom."
'2-5
"[D]ifferences among women.., such as... race and class" do
not "undercut the meaningfulness or even the reality of gender."2 52
For "to show that an observation or experience is not the same for all
women proves only that it is not biological, not that it is not
gendered."253 Similarly, the fact that some things that happen to wo-
men, like rape, also happen to some men, does not undermine the
reality of male dominance.254 MacKinnon gives a powerful example:
"That some non-Jews, such as gypsies and gays, were victims of the
Holocaust does not mean the Holocaust was not, or was less, anti-
Semitic. ,, '5
Women recognize the commonality of their oppression through
"consciousness raising." 6 A woman may come to a consciousness
raising group with "an unspecific, often unattached, but just barely
submerged discontent. '' 21 7 Through talking with other women, a wo-
man becomes conscious of her "oppression as common rather than
244. Id.
245. CATHAgrNE MAcKNNoN, Not by Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis Schafly,
in FEMrIsM UNMODIrED, supra note 3, at 21, 26 [hereinafter MAcKINNON, Law Alone].
246. MAcKINNON, Introduction, supra note 3, at 5.
247. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 50.
248. Id.
249. MACKINNON, Law Alone, supra note 245, at 25.
250. It.
251. MACKINNON, FEmisr STATE, supra note 225, at 10.
252. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 56.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 225, at 83-105.
257. Id. at 85.
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remaining on the level of bad feelings."258 She learns that "apparently
unchangeable dictates of the natural order are powerful social con-
ventions." 259 Consciousness raising "unmask[s]" the "[r]ealities hid-
den under layers of valued myth, '260 and "through socializing
women's knowing, transforms it,"'261 thereby making the "chains be-
come visible.
262
MacKinnon's discussion of consciousness raising seems to indi-
cate that only those women who have thrown off the shackles of their
own false consciousness, such as MacKinnon herself, possess the cor-
rect women's standpoint.263 MacKinnon supports this intuition with
her reply to Phyllis Schafly, an antifeminist opponent of the Equal
Rights Amendment,264 in a debate. MacKinnon states, "I'm saying
[Schlafly's] analysis of her own experience is wrong. '265 Thus,
although all women experience oppression as women, just as in the
marxist view all workers experience oppression as workers, only some
understand the nature of the oppression they experience.266
For MacKinnon, one benefit of viewing the world from the wo-
men's standpoint is that this standpoint unmasks the false universal-
ism and objectivity of the dominant standpoint in Western culture-
the male standpoint.267 This universal male standpoint reflects a no-
tion of scientific objectivity that
as a stance toward the world erects two tests to which its
method must conform: distance and aperspectivity. To per-
ceive reality accurately, one must be distant from what one is
looking at and view it from no place and at no time in partic-
ular, hence from all places and times at once.... [This] epis-
temology decisively controls not only the form of knowing
but also its content by defining how to proceed, the process
of knowing, and by confining what is worth knowing to that
which can be known in this way.268
258. Id. at 86.
259. Id. at 91.
260. Id. at 89.
261. Id. at 101.
262. 1d at 104.
263. Id. at 83-105.
264. MAcKiNNON, Law Alone, supra note 245, at 22.
265. Id. at 30.
266. See MAcKimNoN, FE mINsw STATE, supra note 225, at 103-04.
267. MAcKNNoN, FEmINI STATE, supra note 225, at 96-98; MAcKNNON, Desire and
Power, supra note 228, at 51-58.
268. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 225, at 97.
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The "nonsituated, distanced standpoint '26 9 is not only male in the
sense that it reflects the male view, but it also facilitates male domi-
nance by being a standpoint of objectification: "[T]o look at the world
objectively is to objectify it. The act of control... is itself eroticized
under male supremacy. '270 That is, the male standpoint looks at the
world the way it looks at women, as an object to be conquered. 271 In
this system
the neutrality of objectivity and of maleness are coextensive
linguistically [that is, the neutral is male and the male is neu-
tral], whereas women occupy the marked, the gendered, the
different, the forever-female position.... [M]en have been
knowers, mind; women have been "to-be-known," matter,
that which is to be controlled and subdued.272
Views of reality that conflict with scientific objectivity "are authorita-
tively defined as unreal or irrational."'27 Looking at male objectivity
from the women's standpoint
sheds a rather distinct light on the indeterminacy/determi-
nacy question as men have agonized over it. Take the prob-
lem of "is there a reality and how do I know I'm right about
it?" The "is there a there there?" business.... Women know
the world is out there because it hits us in the face. Literally.
We are raped, battered, pornographed, defined by force, by a
world that begins, at least, entirely outside us. No matter
what we think about it, how we try to think it out of exist-
ence or into a different shape for us to inhabit, the world
remainsreal.... We can tell that it is there, because no mat-
ter what we do, we can't get out of it. Male power is for us-
therefore is-this kind of fact.2 74
From a women's standpoint,
Cartesian275 doubt. ., comes from the luxury of a position of
power that entails the possibility of making the world as one
269. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 50.
270. Id
271. See id.
272. Id. at 55.
273. MACKINNON, FEMnnsr STATE, supra note 225, at 99.
274. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 57; see MACKINNON, FEMINIST
STATE, supra note 225, at 123.
275. This is a reference to the philosopher Rend Descartes, who arrived at his famous
formula "cogito, ergo sum" by doubting the existence of the physical objects around him.
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at 74; see supra note 112 (discussing Descartes's
philosophy).
[Vol. 28:1197
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRUTH
thinks or wants it to be. Which is exactly the male stand-
point. You can't tell the difference between what you think
and the way the world is-or which came first-if your
standpoint for thinking and being is one of social power.276
MacKinnon distinguishes from this typically male epistemology a
feminist epistemology which
locates the position of consciousness, from which one knows,
in the standpoint and time frame of that attempting to be
known.... Knowledge is neither a copy nor a miscopy of
reality, neither representative nor misrepresentative as the
scientific model would have it, but a response to living in it.
Truth is in a sense a collective experience of truth, in which
"knowledge" is assimilated to consciousness, a consciousness
that exists as a reality in the world, not merely in the head.
This epistemology does not at all deny that a relation exists
between thought and some reality other than thought ....
Rather, it redefines the epistemological issue from being the
scientific one, the relation between knowledge and objective
reality, to a problem of the relation of consciousness to social
being.277
This epistemology recognizes that "cognitive judgments need not
be universally agreed upon to be true. '278 MacKinnon recognizes that
"[s]ituated thought is as likely to produce 'false consciousness' as ac-
cess to truth."279 Thus, "[t]he account of error, of women's
nonfeminist perception of their situation, is that the perception is
probably as justified by aspects of the woman's experience as a femi-
nist perception would be." 80
MacKinnon does not explain exactly what is to be done about this
"error," although the above passage seems to indicate that it is to be
tolerated as "justified. ' 28 1 MacKinnon realizes that "[g]iven the im-
peratives of women's lives, the necessity to avoid punishment..,. it is
not irrational for women to see themselves in a way that makes their
necessary compliance tolerable, even satisfying. '' 282 But MacKinnon's
276. MACKNNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 58.
277. MAcKNNON, FEMinsr STATE, supra note 225, at 98-99.
278. 1d at 102.
279. IM. at 108.
280. Id. at 102.
281. Id.
282. I. at 100.
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reply to Phyllis Schafly seems to indicate that such error is not her
women's standpoint-even if it comes from a woman
283
How does MacKinnon know that she is right and Schafly is
wrong? If a "nonfeminist perception" is "probably as justified... as a
feminist perception would be,"2s4 how can feminism even justify itself
as superior to theories which reinforce male domination? It is impos-
sible to tell which perspective is closer to reality unless one has criteria
that are not drawn from any perspective-that is, criteria drawn from
objective knowledge of objective reality. Without such criteria in-
dependent of perspective, there is no real reason to pick feminism
over patriarchy.
There appears to be a fundamental inconsistency in MacKinnon's
theory. On the one hand, she states that she is not trying to present an
"objective" reality of women's oppression, but instead "the point of
view of women."285 This is the language of postmodern knowledge
theory. 86 On the other hand, MacKinnon obviously feels that there is
a material reality to women's oppression.287 For example, MacKinnon
says that her feminist account of pornography as a form of violence
towards women is "not just a matter of perspective, but a matter of
reality. 2 8 This reality of the abuse of women "hits us in the face.
Literally." 9 These assertions seem to echo traditional truth and
knowledge theory. But MacKinnon's argues that the true reality of
women's oppression is seen only through her women's standpoint.
29
This seems to indicate that before one can clearly see this reality, one
must take a certain perspective toward the world-MacKinnon's fem-
inist perspective.
Perhaps, for MacKinnon, her feminist perspective is so close to
the reality of women's oppression that it can be used to judge other
perspectives. As such, this perspective is simply a new objective per-
spective. And yet MacKinnon confuses this issue by couching her
analysis in the terms of postmodern knowledge theory.29' MacKinnon
derides the quest for objectivity as traditionally male,292 but then at
283. See MAcKINNON, Law Alone, supra note 245, at 30.
284. MAcKINNON, FEMINIST STATE, supra note 225, at 102.
285. CATHARN'E A. MAcKINNON, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED, supra note 3, at 86 [hereinafter MAcKiNNON, Sex and Violence].
286. See supra part mI.B-D.
287. MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 58.
288. MAcKINNON, Sex and Violence, supra note 285, at 91.
289. MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 57.
290. MAcKINNON, Law Alone, supra note 245, at 26.
291. See id. at 21-22; MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 50.
292. See MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 55.
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the same time she argues that the perspective that she just happens to
hold, the women's perspective, is congruent with reality. 93 In other
words, some perspectives are more equal than others.
Stanley Fish has made just this criticism of MacKinnon. 294 He
discusses MacKinnon's criticism of the Indian practice of suttee, where
women throw themselves on the funeral pyres of their dead hus-
bands.2 95 Fish states:
What is wrong with Indian women from the feminist point of
view is not that they are willing... to die for the beliefs that
have captured them, but that they have not been captured
S. . by the right beliefs. Were they to be captured by the
right (feminist) beliefs, they would still be willing to die for
them, and in doing so they would be the recipients, not of
MacKinnon's pitying scorn... but of... praise... 
296
Thus, for Fish, MacKinnon's discussion of suttee "make[s] clear
(although apparently not to her) that the issue is not the removal of
objectivity, but the determination of the point of view from which ob-
jectivity... will reveal itself.
''297
I would describe MacKinnon's theory this way: Transcendent
truth exists, and part of that truth is the truth of the system of wo-
men's oppression, which exists materially in the same way as the op-
pression of workers exists for marxists. Persons view things through
socially constructed perspectives, but persons can shift perspectives
through the consciousness raising process, and some perspectives cap-
ture reality better than others. In addition, one perspective-the "wo-
men's" or "feminist" perspective-captures the material reality of
women's oppression so well that it can be used to judge all other
perspectives.
It appears, then, that MacKinnon is really a traditional truth and
knowledge theorist masquerading as a postmodern by wearing the
clothing of postmodern knowledge theory.
293. See MAcKiNoN, Sex and Violence, supra note 285, at 91.
294. STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road [hereinafter
FISH, Introduction], in DOING WHAT Comrs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RsiroRic, AND TnE
PRACnCE OF THEORY IN LrrERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1, 16-25 (1989) [hereinafter
FISH, DOING WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY].
295. Id. at 19-20.
296. Id. at 19.
297. Id. at 20.
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C. Stanley Fish's Imprisoning Paradigm
In his collection of essays, Doing What Comes Naturally,298 Stan-
ley Fish describes what he calls "anti-foundationalism":
Anti-foundationalism teaches that questions of fact, truth,
correctness, validity, and clarity can neither be posed nor an-
swered in reference to some extracontextual, ahistorical,
nonsituational reality, or rule, or law, or value; rather, anti-
foundationalism asserts, all of these matters are intelligible
and debatable only within the precincts of the contexts or
situations or paradigms or communities that give them their
local and changeable shape. 99
The reader's intuition that Fish's anti-foundationalism sounds a
lot like the postmodern philosophy I have been discussing will be con-
firmed when I mention that Fish lists as anti-foundationalist theorists,
among others: Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, Clifford Geertz, and
Jacques Derrida, as well as himself.
300
Fish's work is concerned with what we will find at the end of a
journey "down the [anti-foundationalist] road."'30 1 At the end of this
road, Fish argues, transcendent knowledge, including any theory that
stands outside of our social practices and judges them, is impossible.3°
All knowledge is embedded because we are "always and already"
30 3
situated cognitively in our own forms of life.
Like Wittgenstein, Fish asserts that "certainty," or the attachment
to our beliefs, is not a result of the correspondence of these beliefs to
an outside reality, but instead is a result of our situated position.
3 04
Fish writes that "[i]t is thus a condition of human life always to be
operating as an extension of beliefs and assumptions that are histori-
cally contingent, and yet to be holding those beliefs and assumptions
298. FISH, DOING WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY, supra note 294.
299. STANLEY FISH, Anti-Foundationalisn, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composi-
tion, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 294, at 344 [hereinafter, FISH, Anti-
Foundationalism]. Fish also calls this philosophy "anti-formalist" in some of his essays.
See, ag., FISH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 1-33 (using term "anti-formalist" rather
than "anti-foundationalist").
300. FIsH, Anti-Foundationalism, supra note 299, at 345.
301. FisH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 25.
302. See id. at 14-15.
303. Id. at 26.
304. STANLEY FISH, Anti-Professionalism, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra
note 294, at 246; see supra part ILI.C (discussing Wittgenstein's postmodern certainty).
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with an absoluteness that is the necessary consequence of the abso-
luteness with which they hold.., us. ' 30 5
Fish criticizes other postmodern theorists for arguing that once
we recognize the embeddedness of all knowledge, we can then escape
our contingent cognitive structures. 0 6 Fish cautions, that while
[i]t might seem that in traveling [the anti-foundationalist]
road one is progressively emancipated from all constraints
... the removal of independent constraints to which the self
might or might not conform does not leave the self free but
reveals the self to be always and already constrained by the
contexts of practice.
307
Thus, "constraints are not something one can either embrace or throw
off because they are constitutive of the self.
308
Even accepting the fact that all knowledge is contingent and situ-
ated will not free us from our beliefs.30 9 Consequently, it does not
matter whether anti-foundationalism is embraced or rejected:
[A]nti-foundationalist thought deprives us of nothing; all it
offers is an alternative account of how the certainties that
will still grip us when we are persuaded to it came to be in
place.... [W]hen you get to the end of the anti-[foundation-
alist] road nothing will have changed except the answers you
might give to some traditional questions in philosophy and
literary theory.310
For Fish, then, we are imprisoned in the various paradigms which
constitute our very selves and are the foundation of our cognitive
ability.31
1
Because constraints cannot be removed, Fish argues that the fear
that anti-foundationalism will lead to relativism is illusory. 1 2 Fish de-
scribes the fear of relativism as "[t]he fear ... of a world without
principle, a world where might makes right, and personal preferences
run roughshod over the rules and laws intended to constrain them.
3 1 3
Fish responds to this fear by arguing that it is true that "in the absence
of a perspective independent of interpretation some interpretive per-
305. FISH, Anti-Professionalism, supra note 304, at 246.
306. Id. at 225-42.
307. FISH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 26.
308. Id. at 27.
309. FISH, Anti-Professionalism, supra note 304, at 225-42.
310. FISH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 26.
311. FISH, Anti-Professionalism, supra note 304, at 242-46.
312. FISH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 10, 26-27.
313. I1d at 10.
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spective will always rule by virtue of having won out over its competi-
tors. '3 14 This does not mean, however, that the "personal
preferences" of the self will then be allowed complete freedom.
315
Such freedom is impossible because, quite simply, there are no "per-
sonal" preferences if "personal" means unconstrained by a person's
socially embedded condition.3 16 Therefore, "the condition of being
without constraints is quite literally unimaginable and therefore need
not be feared.
3 1 7
The journey down the anti-foundationalist road also takes us to a
place where theory itself has no consequences.318 This is because
"theory"-which Fish defines as "a set of principles or rules or proce-
dures that is attached to ... no particular field of activity, but is of
sufficient generality to be thought of as a constraint on... all fields of
activity" 319-must be a set of "constraints that are more than the con-
tent of a practice from which they are indistinguishable,"3 20 and such a
set of constraints is not possible.
What, then, is theory for Fish? It is merely a certain type of dis-
course that is itself a practice, instead of standing apart from and judg-
ing all practices.321 As such, theory can have practical consequences,
but it cannot have theoretical consequences.322 Theoretical conse-
quences are impossible because it is impossible for human beings to
think "theoretically," where this means thinking apart from their own
situated practices.32
Fish discusses the impossibility of transcendent knowledge in his
essay Anti-Professionalism."'4 There, he argues that critique of pro-
fessional institutions is impossible because such critique would require
an ahistorical, nonsituated standpoint: "a self that can rise above its
historical situation to a state where the false imperatives of merely
institutional forms will be exchanged for the true imperatives that can
now be espied by a newly cleaned vision."' 25
314. It.
315. Id. at 10-11.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 27.
318. Id. at 14.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 14-15.
322. Id.
323. See id.
324. FIsH, Anti-Professionalism, supra note 304, at 215.
325. Id. at 233.
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Thus, anti-professionalism is "indefensible" because it incorrectly
assumes the "possibility of free selves choosing extrainstitutional val-
ues by means of independent criteria. '326 There are no values which
are extrainstitutional because values are a product of human agree-
ments and forms of life, and can never originate from outside such
situated human constructs. 2 7
Any critique of an institution would originate from within that
institution, in which case it could not engender any radical change, or
from within another institution, which would make the substitution of
one set of institutional values for another merely a political exer-
cise.328 While we can still try to change our professional paradigms,
we cannot advocate our new changes on the grounds that they are not
"professional" in the pejorative sense of "political" or "interested,"
because every new set of values is interested, situated, and political.
329
If one is a professional, one cannot escape from the paradigm of pro-
fessionalism, and this is why true anti-professionalism is impossible.330
Fish recognizes and addresses one common objection to his
postmodern theory: that he is positing anti-foundationalism itself as a
non-contingent, transcendent truth.3 31 Fish phrases the objection this
way:
[E]ither anti-foundationalism .. . is asserted seriously, in
which case it is asserted as a foundation and undoes the very
position it supposedly proclaims, or it is asserted unserious-
ly, that is, not urged on us as a statement of what is really the
case, and therefore it has no claim on our serious
attention.332
Fish meets this objection by arguing that those who make it miscon-
strue the anti-foundationalist claim, "which is not that there are no
foundations, but that whatever foundations there are (and there al-
ways are some) have been established by persuasion, that is, in the
course of argument and counterargument on the basis of examples
and evidence that are themselves cultural and contextual.
3 33
Fish's argument is that anti-foundationalism is a "thesis about
how foundations emerge, and in contradistinction to the assumptions
326. Id. at 242.
327. Id at 242-43.
328. Id. at 243.
329. Id. at 242.
330. See id.
331. FISH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 29.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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that foundations do not emerge but simply are, anchoring the uni-
verse. '' 334 Thus anti-foundationalism can assert itself like any other
argument, and can even assert itself as absolutely true, as long as
"there is no argument that holds the field against it.'' 335 Yet if this is
true, and Fish's anti-foundationalism is just what he says-one argu-
ment among many-then we are certainly free to disregard it if we do
not like its content or its possible results.
Fish's anti-foundationalism must meet another challenge, how-
ever-the challenge of change. If we are so embedded in these cul-
tural paradigms, how does any culture ever change? From time to
time, social paradigms and world views do appear to change radically.
Human beings, through an exercise of their own will, seem to be able
to reject social paradigms into which they have been acculturated all
of their lives.
Fish addresses the issue of change by arguing that, among the
beliefs of a person belonging to a certain "interpretive community" or
form of life, there is a set of beliefs regarding when and how "one's
assumptions are subject to challenge and possible revision. '336 In this
way, even one's criteria for change come from within one's social and
cultural paradigms, so that when a "new" idea is incorporated into
one's belief system, it does not undermine, but instead reinforces, that
system.337
Thus, it is impossible to be influenced by something that is wholly
outside one's already existing framework because "the mind is in-
formed by assumptions that limit what it can even notice. ' 331 In other
words, while it may seem that a new idea or belief comes from within
a totally independent paradigm, this cannot be true because if this
were so, it could not even be noticed from within one's own set of
beliefs.339 A "new" belief cannot be incorporated into one's own set
of beliefs inless there is "already in place, as a part of [one's] commu-
nity's conception of itself, the assumption of a relationship between it
and [the new idea or belief]." 340
334. Id at 29-30.
335. Id at 30.
336. STANLEY FISH, Change, in FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note
294, at 141, 146-47.
337. See id
338. Id at 146.
339. Id
340. Id at 147.
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Once the "new" belief is adopted, it may require alteration of
other beliefs or "the entire system or network they comprise" 41 in
order to achieve equilibrium within one's preexisting belief system.
This still does not mean, however, that the "new" belief was at one
time something wholly outside one's socially embedded set of beliefs
and assumptions 42 Although the configuration and boundaries of
one's belief system can change and expand, such change always comes
from within that belief system, and can never be accomplished by
ideas totally outside of its purview. 43
In this way Fish attempts to explain the phenomenon of change in
a world where knowledge is socially constructed and where truth is
not an independent force for causing change?"44 It seems that Fish's
interpretation of the process of change from within denies the possi-
bility of radical change. Instead, the socially constructed conscious-
ness is changed gradually and partially by the adoption of ideas that
are already within its frame of reference3 45
Yet if the paradigms of patriarchy are as pervasive and all-encom-
passing as described by feminists like Catharine MacKinnon,346 how
has feminism even been allowed a foothold in our socially constructed
system of beliefs? For feminism to be adopted under Fish's model of
change, feminism must have been able to fit within our already estab-
lished system of beliefs to the extent that, when it came onto the
scene, we were able to notice it347 If this is the case, then feminism
may not be as radical as some proponents think it is-it must instead
be a reformulation, with a new spin, of already held beliefs within the
system of patriarchy. If,- on the other hand, feminism is something
totally new-a paradigm entirely outside that of patriarchy-then the
emergence of feminism would belie Fish's theory of change.
As noted earlier, Fish denies asserting anti-foundationalism as a
transcendent truth?4n Fish understands that to do so would make his
theory internally inconsistent.349 Asserting anti-foundationalism as
transcendent truth would be inconsistent for one of two reasons:
Either anti-foundationalism posits that there is no transcendent truth,
341. Id, at 146.
342. I1& at 147.
343. Id. at 146-47.
344. Id. at 143-45.
345. Id. at 146-47.
346. See supra part IV.B.
347. FISH, Change, supra note 336, at 146.
348. FisH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 29-30.
349. Id. at 29.
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and thus Fish is saying that the transcendent truth is that there is no
transcendent truth; or anti-foundationalism posits that all knowledge
is embedded, and thus Fish's claim that he has seen transcendent truth
is hypocritical. To avoid this mess, Fish simply posits anti-foundation-
alism as an embedded truth.350
From which inconsistency is Fish shying away in declining to
claim transcendent truth status for anti-foundationalism? Is Fish im-
plying simply that knowledge of transcendent truth is not possible
because all knowledge is embedded? Or is he arguing that transcen-
dent truth itself does not exist? This is a difficult question. Once Fish
adopts embedded knowledge, he must also admit that even if tran-
scendent truth does exist, human beings are not able to see it. Thus,
the existence or nonexistence of transcendent truth becomes
irrelevant.
Yet I still get the feeling that Fish really thinks that he has seen
the truth of anti-foundationalism in some more substantial way than
mere embedded truth, even given his disclaimer. But if this is so, he
does not admit it. Instead, he avoids the inconsistency argument by
asserting that his anti-foundationalism is just one of many embedded
truths, to be debated and either rejected or accepted by persons in this
particular time and place. 51
D. Drucilla Cornell's "Recollective Imagination"
There was a time when you were not a slave, remember that.
You walked alone, full of laughter, you bathed bare-bellied.
You say you have lost all recollection of it, remember.... You
say there are no words to describe this time, you say it does
not exist. But remember. Make an effort to remember. Or,
failing that, invent.
352
Drucilla Cornell also paints a postmodern picture, but her picture
is radically different from that of Stanley Fish. 3  Cornell concludes
that the fact that "we are immersed in an already-given historical real-
350. Ld. at 29-30.
351. Id.
352. MoNIQuE WrrrG, Ls GuRuja._s 89 (David LeVay trans., Beacon Press 1985).
353. DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS: RECOLLECTIVE IMAGINATION AND
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (1993) [hereinafter CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS].
[Vol. 28:1197
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRUTH
ity of understanding [does] not.., turn that reality into a prison which
bars us from innovation, [in fact] the exact opposite is the case." 54
Critique of institutions is possible precisely because our forms of
life are indeterminate, constantly changing and open-ended.355 This
indeterminacy results from the repeatability, or what Derrida calls
iterability, of language.356 Language is necessarily intersubjective and
capable of being repeated by any speaker. 7 This "allows for both
understanding and communication and for misunderstanding and re-
activation of the range of definition.1
35 8
In addition, language, as a system of signs, is indeterminate
because
[a] sign is always in referential relation to some other sign or
interpretant. Signs are never simply self-referential or mere
representations of an object. In this sense, there can be no
full determinacy of any institutionalized system of meaning,
including the legal system, because the sign itself always
points us to another sign beyond the repetition implicit in
self-reference or direct reference to the designated object.
As long as the sign is determined in a relation to another
sign, there can be no closure of the process of interpretation
in the discovery of the truth of the actual.359
For Cornell legal reasoning involves such a process of interpreta-
tion, since the meaning of the words in statutes and case law will al-
ways be indeterminate.360 This interpretation is "retrospective in the
sense that we always begin the process of interpretation from within a
pregiven context."' 361 This fact, however, does not shackle legal inter-
pretation because "ascertaining the meaning of a norm or proposition
involves us in an imaginative enterprise. ' 362 Legal interpretation de-
354. DRUCmLA CORNELL, Pragmatism, Recollective Imagination, and Transformative
Legal Interpretation, in TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 353, at 27 [hereinafter CORmNLL,
Recollective Imagination].
355. DRUCiLLA CoRNELL, "Convention" and Critique, in CORNELL, TRANSFORMA-
TIONS, supra note 353, at 13.
356. Id. at 15; see supra part II.D (discussing Derrida's theory of the iterability of
language).
357. CORNELL, "Convention" and Critique, supra note 355, at 15.
358. Id
359. CORNELL, Recollective Imagination, supra note 354, at 25. In this essay Cornell
attributes this discussion of the indeterminacy of language to Charles Peirce. Id. But her
focus on indeterminacy is also similar to that of Saussure and Derrida. See supra part
HI.B, Ill.D.
360. CORNELL, Recollective Imagination, supra note 354, at 27-30.
361. Id at 27.
362. Id. at 28.
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mands a "recollective imagin[ing]" of our pregiven context.363 In do-
ing this we necessarily choose between competing visions of the past.
However, "[b]ecause the 'past' is always offered to us within compet-
ing interpretive frameworks, we cannot prefer one framework over
the other because one is not a framework at all but a pure account of
what 'actually was.' "36 In other words, we cannot rely on the con-
gruence of one interpretation of the past with the "Real"-with a cap-
ital "R"-past, since "the meaning of the past cannot be reduced to a
pure description," 365 and "the past cannot be fully recollected.
'366
The past, therefore, "cannot be known other than through
interpretation.
' '367
The fact that "[t]he past is there, but not finished" 368 allows a
judge to use recollective imagination to bridge past and future in a
judicial decision that, for the moment at least, "stabilize[s] legal mean-
ing., 36 9 Thus, "[a] legal verdict is a creative supplement to the texts
upon which it relies, which once again brings the meaning of the text
to life."37 0 In addition,
[t]he theoretical indeterminacy of legal doctrine as a system
of signs leaves open opportunity for active intervention on
the part of the individual lawyer. The reality of our estab-
lished sittlich371 commitments is not just there and then re-
flected in the language of legal argumentation. Instead, the
reality of Sittlichkeit is constituted and reconstituted in the
very process of legal argumentation and judicial decision.
37 2
Thus, "[t]he rules of the game can be shifted.... By shifting the rules
of the game, we can also expand the boundaries of our form of
life. 373 Through the process of recollective imagination we can "re-
member" our forms of life in a creative process that is at the same
time a process of invention.374 When we remember, we necessarily
363. See id. at 23-24.
364. Id. at 29.
365. 1d
366. L at 29-30.
367. Id. at 30.
368. Idt
369. Id. at 29.
370. Id. at 30.
371. According to Cornell, the term Sittlichkeit was used by the philosopher Hegel to
refer to a community's collective ethics. I&. at 25. Cornell seems to use sittlich as an adjec-
tive with a meaning close to "situated" or "embedded." Id. at 32.
372. Id. at 32.
373. Id. at 33. For discussion of Wittgenstein's term "form of life," see supra part Ifl.C.
374. CoRNLL, Recollective Imagination, supra note 354, at 28-30.
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invent, and in that process of invention, we, as socially situated human
subjects, can find freedom to change our forms of life.
375
Cornell argues that feminism involves such a reinterpretation of
the word "Woman," and the concept of the "feminine. ' 376 Cornell
argues that such a reimagining of the feminine must necessarily be
"metaphoric, '377 because only a metaphoric understanding "does not
reduce the feminine to a set of characterizations shared by all women"
and "reset the trap of rigid gender identities, deny[ing] the real differ-
ences between [women].
378
Understanding the "significance of the feminine within sexual dif-
ference '379 in a metaphoric way allows for a "feminine voice and a
feminine 'reality' that can be identified as such ' 380 without at the
same time returning to an "essentialist or naturalist theor[y] of
Woman."
38 1
Cornell advocates what she calls "ethical feminism, ' 3  which
"emphasizes the role of... imagination, not description, in creating
solidarity between women. ' 383 The metaphoric reimagining of Wo-
man is possible for ethical feminists because "[d]econstruction [has]
demonstrate[d] that there is no essence of Woman that can be eideti-
cally abstracted from the linguistic representations of Woman.""
Without an "essence of Woman" acting as a constraint on interpreta-
tion, feminists are free to reinterpret Woman metaphorically. For
Cornell this means that "[w]e are not fated to simply repeat the same
old dance, we can be out of step. The feminine is not engraved in
stone. '385 The meaning of the feminine can never "be frozen because
of the slippage of meaning inherent in the metaphoricity of
language.
'386
Cornell advocates that feminists use this indeterminacy of lan-
guage to their advantage, by gradually changing and shifting words
375. Id at 25-33.
376. DRUCILLA CORNELL, The Doubly-Prized World. Myth, Allegory, and the Feminine,
in TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 353, at 57-111 [hereinafter CORNELL, Doubly-Prized].
377. Id at 58.
378. I.
379. Id. at 57.
380. Id. at 58.
381. Id. at 57.
382. Id. at 59.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 71. Eidetic means "of, or relating to... essences." WEBSTER's, supra note
153, at 727.
385. CORNELL, Doubly-Prized, supra note 376, at 88.
386. Id. at 92.
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and concepts."8 For Cornell, language is malleable by the individual
human will; feminists can use language indeterminacy to affect the
consensus about our settled meanings and forms of life.388 Decon-
struction techniques can destabilize meanings in ways that help wo-
men break free from old and outworn forms of life into ones that are
more feminist.
389
Cornell criticizes Catharine MacKinnon for not attempting a fem-.
inist reinterpretation of "Woman.1390 Cornell argues that by defining
women solely as "fuckees," MacKinnon reduces women to the defini-
tion patriarchy has given to them instead of liberating them from it.3 91
Cornell argues that MacKinnon "cannot successfully develop her own
feminist theory of the state because she is unable to affirm feminine
sexual difference as other than victimization."
'39 2
Cornell calls for a "re-metaphorization"3 93 of feminine sexuality
which emphasizes its myriad forms, instead of reducing it to "getting
fucked.1394 Such a reimagining is possible because "no reality can
perfectly totalize itself because reality, including the reality of male
domination, is constituted in and through language in which institu-
tionalized meaning can never be fully protected from slippage and
reinterpretation." 39
5
It is crucial to understanding the difference between the theories
of Cornell and Fish to also understand the difference between the
ideas of Wittgenstein and Derrida.396 The postmodern arguments of
Wittgenstein and Derrida are very different: Whereas Wittgenstein
argues that meaning is always situated contextually,397 Derrida attacks
the notion that meaning can ever be situated contextually because lan-
guage is radically indeterminate.398 Fish, following Wittgenstein, ar-
gues that the social embeddedness of our knowledge creates a prison
387. See id. at 57-60, 94.
388. See id at 94.
389. Id. at 86-97.
390. Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of
MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE LJ. 2247,2256-58,2264-68
(1991) (book review).
391. Id. at 2250, 2265-67.
392. Id. at 2248.
393. Id. at 2275.
394. Id. at 2267.
395. Id. at 2264.
396. For a discussion of Wittgenstein and Derrida, see supra part IlI.C-D.
397. See supra part m.C.
398. See supra part Ill.D.
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of language from which we can never escape.399 Cornell, following
Derrida, argues that the iterability of language creates a radically
indeterminate context where no meaning is ever fixed, and where new
meaning can always be created to further the agenda of the
speaker.40 °
Cornell highlights this difference between her theory and that of
Fish in her critique of Fish's article on anti-professionalism. 40 1 Cornell
argues that critique generally, and anti-professionalism in particular,
"does not necessarily coincide with the belief in essences or a form of
true meaning." 4°2 This is because the boundaries of our professional
form of life are themselves indeterminate, and the agreements neces-
sary for discourse within our form of life do not necessarily force
agreement among the participants as to how to evaluate that profes-
sional form of life.40 3 Disagreement is comprehensible, then, because
"we live in an open-ended language game. '"404 Thus, anti-profession-
alism is always possible, because the boundaries of what is "profes-
sional" are always changing.40 5
The work of Cornell and Fish contains similarities as well as dif-
ferences. Both embrace the postmodern notion of embedded knowl-
edge, and neither mentions perspective shifting, or a privileged
objective perspective. Thus, they both embrace a form of knowledge
that is more firmly embedded than that of either Minow40 6 or
MacKinnon.4 °7
Does Cornell retain transcendent truth? This is difficult to deter-
mine. If Cornell argues for transcendent truth status for her ethical
feminism, she will not be able to support such a claim because of her
embrace of embedded knowledge. If she merely asserts ethical femi-
nism as embedded truth, then she loses any moral justification for as-
serting ethical feminism over any other theory. A similar conflict is
also apparent in the work of Minow and MacKinnon.4 °8 Minow deals
with this conflict by modifying embedded knowledge to allow for per-
399. See supra part IV.C.
400. CoRnLL, Doubly-Prized, supra note 376, at 64-74, 86-97.
401. CORNELL, "Convention" and Critique, supra note 355, at 12; see supra part IV.C.
402. ConRNLL, "Convention" and Critique, supra note 355, at 13.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. See supra part IV.A.
407. See supra part IV.B.
408. See supra part IV.A-B.
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spective shifting.4 09 MacKinnon creates a hierarchy of perspectives. 410
Because Cornell does not modify her own embedded knowledge, she
has no way to justify her choice of ethical feminism. She cannot ap-
peal to transcendent truth, because her totally embedded knowledge
denies her any opportunity to see transcendent truth even if it does
exist. Thus for Cornell, as for Fish,4 11 the existence or nonexistence of
transcendent truth becomes irrelevant.
E. Summary of the Approaches of These Theorists to Postmodern
Truth and Knowledge Theory
Now comes the time to begin to explore where these four theo-
rists fit in my outline, preliminarily sketched above:412
1. Traditional Theory (MacKinnon)
a. Transcendent truth = oppression of women.
b. Transcendent knowledge = "women's perspective"
(MacKinnon's). Other perspectives are inferior as they
are not as congruent with transcendent truth.
2. Partial Postmodernism (Minow)
a. Transcendent truth = general concepts like Justice.
b. Embedded knowledge = perspectives and contexts.
Perspective shifting is possible, but this may require
some transcendent thought.
3. Partial or Total Postmodernism (Fish/Cornell)
a. Status of transcendent truth is unknown, as embed-
ded knowledge does not allow human beings knowledge
as to its existence.
b. Embedded knowledge.
1. Changing ones own paradigms is impossible
(Fish).
2. Changing one's own paradigms is possible be-
cause of iterability of language (Cornell).
V. THE DIFFICULTY OF POSTMODERN FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
In the exploration of the work of these four theorists, this Com-
ment has illuminated a variety of tensions and inconsistencies. 413
These tensions stem from a fundamental problem within postmodern
409. See supra part IV.A.
410. See supra part IV.B.
411. See supra part IV.C.
412. See supra part HILE.
413. See supra part IV.A-D.
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theory-if a postmodern theorist makes a transcendent truth claim for
her theory while at the same time adopting embedded knowledge, her
theory is internally inconsistent; if she denies transcendent truth status
for her theory, she loses any moral justification for advocating one
theory over another.
In the work of the three feminist legal theorists-Minow, MacK-
innon, and Cornell-this tension is very evident: On the one hand,
these theorists are tempted to make some sort of a transcendent truth
claim for feminism; yet, on the other hand, their adoption of
postmodern knowledge theory, and possibly also postmodern truth
theory, makes this impossible.414 To the extent that they adopt
postmodern truth theory, they undermine any moral justification for
their feminist goals; to the extent that they adopt postmodern knowl-
edge theory, they undermine any privileged status for their knowl-
edge-claims about the reality of woman's oppression.
This is why Catharine MacKinnon, while adopting postmodem
knowledge theory language by using "women's standpoint," still
makes the claim that "women's standpoint" is in some way a privi-
leged standpoint-one that is more valuable than other standpoints
because it illuminates the reality of women's oppression.
415
This is why, although Martha Minow talks about perspectives and
argues that there is no vision without perspective, she then modifies
her postmodern knowledge theory claim with the caveat that perspec-
tive shifting is possible.416 She may intuitively understand that in a
world where persons can never, even for a moment, look through the
eyes of another, the basis for social justice is undermined because
compassion and righteous anger are lost.
This is why Drucilla Cornell argues so forcefully that adoption of
postmodern knowledge theory is an opportunity for freedom instead
of bondage within perspective.41 7 Perhaps she understands that such a
position endangers the very notion of radical change-change that
feminism has historically demanded.
In addition, hovering over the work of Cornell and the other
postmodern legal theorists is the specter of relativism. MacKinnon
and Minow avoid this specter by not adopting postmodern truth the-
ory, and by qualifying their postmodern knowledge theory with privi-
414. See supra part IV.A-B, D.
415. See supra part IV.B.
416. See supra part IV.A.
417. See supra part IV.D.
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leged standpoints and perspective shifting.4 18 For Cornell and Fish,
the challenge of relativism is more threatening. Fish avoids it by argu-
ing that we are so embedded in our social paradigms that the simple
knowledge that this is so will not alter our behavior-will not free us
to live in a relativistic world.419
For Cornell, embeddedness means freedom rather than con-
straint;420 thus, relativism is a more difficult issue. She argues that our
freedom in shaping the reality of our world entails a responsibility for
the realities that we shape.4"' But where does this responsibility come
from? To whom are we responsible? Without some theory of truth
that is not contingent on perspective, it is hard to argue that we have
responsibilities to create or sustain a more just world. When the truth
is removed as a yardstick for the measurement of claims of justice,
justice becomes a very difficult notion to defend.
This, then, is the difficulty of postmodern feminist legal theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
Feminism is totally incompatible with postmodern theory. This is
so because feminism is an "ism" not simply about what is, but also
about what ought to be, and about what must be done in order to
create a more just world. As such, feminism must describe and con-
demn with moral force the injustices faced by women, and advocate
the changes necessary to end these injustices. Feminist legal scholars
must condemn as absolutely unjust the legal systems that buy, sell, and
use women's minds and bodies, and that perpetuate the power of all
men over all women.422
In the postmodern world, no society is more just than any other;
no proposition more true than any other. Instead, justice and truth
are merely socially constructed figments of the imagination-concepts
we rely on in order to make sense of it all. We may need to believe
our concepts are true, and indeed we may feel certain that they are,423
but they are mere ghosts constructed by our embeddedness in our
skin, our gender, our language, and our society.
Feminism, if it is to have any meaning at all, must be a theory
about the truth of women's oppression. Feminists disagree about
418. See supra part IV.A-B.
419. FiSH, Introduction, supra note 294, at 10, 26-27.
420. See supra part IV.D.
421. CoRNELa, "Convention" and Critique, supra note 355, at 22.
422. For a description of such a system, see MacKinnon's description supra part IV.B.
423. See supra part IT.C (discussing Wittgenstein's postmodern "certainty").
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many things. But if feminism is to mean anything, feminists must at
least agree that it is objectively true that women have been and are
being oppressed by the various societies, cultures, and political sys-
tems in which they live. Feminists must also agree that this state of
affairs is unjust. Such agreement is what would make them femi-
nists-instead of just idle academics surveying what "is" from the
Ivory Tower and trying to quantify it.424 Feminist legal scholars must
retain the commitment to truth and justice, and the position that
logic-albeit stripped of its masculinist assumptions-and reason are
the pathways to Truth's door.
When one is not concerned with changing anything, or with mak-
ing any impact on this world in which we live, it is easy for one to say
that there is no objective truth, that no state of affairs is more just
than another, that everything is just a "form of life,"4' or a "language
game."426 Postmodern theory, if adopted, can justify a passive, non-
involved stance toward the injustices in our society.42 7 Further, femi-
nist adoption of such postmodern theory removes our very right to
judge, to say to a person or society: What you are doing is unjust-
you are betraying something within you, some moral truth that human
dignity commands.
Postmodern philosopher Richard Rorty himself has recognized
the "morally humiliating""42 implications of such a position:
Suppose that Socrates was wrong, that we have not once
seen the Truth, and so will not, intuitively, recognize it when
we see it again. This means that when the secret police
come, when the torturers violate the innocent, there is noth-
ing to be said to them of the form "There is something within
you which you are betraying. Though you embody the
practices of a totalitarian society which will endure forever,
there is something beyond those practices which condemns
you.
'4 2 9
In the postmodem world view, there is nothing "beyond [our par-
ticular] practices"430 because objective truth does not exist separate
424. "[M]ale academics have been able to afford to talk in ways that mean nothing ......
MAcKiNNON, Introduction, supra note 3, at 4-5.
425. See supra part lII.C.
426. See supra part III.C.
427. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6
YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 197, 203-04 (1994) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Valuing Values].
428. RORTY, Introduction, supra note 103, at xlii.
429. Id.
430. l
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from them, or if there is some truth beyond our practices, we cannot
see it because we cannot transcend those very practices.
There is a reality to the oppression of women that is independent
of what any, or all, women and men think.43' If some or all women
believe that women are not oppressed, they have false conscious-
ness,432 not just a different-and equal-perspective.
Looking at the perspectives of different women is a good thing-
it makes feminist theory more complete and diverse-it helps us to
have better theory, and better explain women's reality. Saying that
there is no truth apart from perspective, on the other hand, will only
lead us to a place where we are no longer able to judge the relative
worth of any particular perspective. If we do this, feminism is dead. It
is dead because at the end of this road it loses the power to judge right
from wrong, and thereby judge patriarchy as wrong and unjust. We
must be able to say that some perspectives are more valid, more true,
than others.
Martha Nussbaum has written about a conference on philosophy
that she attended where the four invited speakers, who were feminist
theorists from "third world" countries, proudly advocated the abstract
ethical language of rights, justice, equality, and personhood in their
papers.433 For them, "abstract values meant the possibility of libera-
tion, whereas contextuality ... meant continued oppression by the
status quo .... [None] conceded that they lived in a postmodern world
• ..nor.., did they think it a conclusion with which they could
live.
'434
This world is not just language games to women who are being
raped in Bosnia,4 35 or genitally mutilated in Africa, or who are being
denied the opportunity to fulfill their dreams in any country because
of sexist assumptions regarding their biological destiny. Such women
431. Catharine MacKinnon writes:
We are raped, battered, pornographed, defined by force, by a world that begins,
at least, entirely outside us. No matter what we think about it, how we try to
think it out of existence or into a different shape for us to inhabit, the world
remains real .... It exists independent of our will.
MAcKr NoN, Desire and Power, supra note 228, at 57.
432. For a discussion of MacKinnon's feminist false consciousness, see supra part IV.B.
433. Nussbaum, Valuing Values, supra note 427, at 198-99.
434. Id. at 199.
435. On the current campaign of rape and genocide directed at women in Bosnia, see
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, 17 HARv. Wo.
MEN's L.J. 5, 12 (1994) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Genocide] ("[T]he men are told to take
the women away and not bring them'back, first they rape them, then they kill them, and
then sometimes rape them again and cut off their breasts and tear out their wombs.").
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do not care to play language games. They want to survive. They want
justice, condemnation, retribution, and, finally, a world free from such
things.436 They know that what happens to them is unjust, not just
unjust in the minds of some social, political, or linguistic groups, but
unjust absolutely and forever.437
Feminist legal scholars must take a long, hard look at the current
trend toward postmodern theory in feminist scholarship.438 What are
the implications of such theory for feminists? How does such theory
benefit women? When feminist legal theorists buy into the
postmodern world view, they are removing the very basis that they
have for real critical theory. They thus join the ranks of "the best"
who "lack all conviction." 439 It goes without saying that in this world
"the worst" will continue right along with "passionate intensity."
440
Feminists must insist upon a deeper perspective. The perspective
where perspective is actually left behind." The vision of a justice
that transcends all perspectives, and of a truth that is more than our
collective delusions. This is what feminism is about. Feminist legal
theory travels down the postmodern road at its peril.
VII. EPILOGUE
To her who asks the nature of her crime they answer that it
was identical with that of the woman of whom it is written that
she saw that the tree of the garden was good to eat, tempting to
436. See Nussbaum, Valuing Values, supra note 427, at 198-99, 208, 219.
437. "Women have created the idea of women's human rights by refusing to abandon
ourselves and each other ... certainly not by transcending the reality of our violations, but
by refusing to deny their reality as violations." MacKinnon, Genocide, supra note 435, at
6.
438. Postmodern theorists could attack the argument made in this Comment-that the
feminist adoption of postmodern theory will result in negative consequences-by arguing
that such a consequentialist argument should not be taken seriously. However, in the
postmodern world, consequentialist arguments are the only arguments available. See
RoRn-, Introduction, supra note 103, at xvii, xlii; cf FISH, Anti-Professionalism, supra note
304, at 214-46 (arguing that critique based on independent, transcendent truth criteria is
impossible). Since these theorists remove transcendent truth as a criterion, they cannot
argue that postmodernism should be adopted because it is objectively true. Feminists
should only be forced to adopt postmodernism if, despite its negative consequences,
postmodernism is the transcendent truth.
439. Yeats, supra note 1, at 1115.
440. Id.
441. John Rawls has named such a perspective the "perspective of eternity," and he
eloquently writes: "Purity of heart, if one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act
with grace and self-command from this point of view." JoHN RAwLS, A THMoRY oF Jus-
aICE 587 (1971).
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see, and that it was the tree requisite for gaining
understanding. 442
According to an old Hebrew myth, it was a woman who first ac-
quired the knowledge to be able to choose between good and evil,
right and wrong, truth and falsity.443 If the myth is to be believed,
then, such choices are our birthright. We cannot shirk this duty be-
cause the choices are too difficult-or because we might be wrong.
Jennifer Lynn Orff*
442. WrrriG, supra note 352, at 82.
443. Genesis 3:1-7.
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